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Abstract 
Environmental policy discussions increasingly focus on issues related to technological change.  
This is partly because the environmental consequences of social activity are frequently affected by the rate 
and direction of technological change, and partly because environmental policy interventions can 
themselves create constraints and incentives that have significant effects on the path of technological 
progress.  This paper, prepared as a chapter draft for the forthcoming Handbook of Environmental 
Economics (North-Holland/Elsevier Science), summarizes current thinking on technological change in the 
broader economics literature, surveys the growing economic literature on the interaction between 
technology and the environment, and explores the normative implications of these analyses.  We begin with 
a brief overview of the economics of technological change, and then examine theory and empirical 
evidence on invention, innovation, and diffusion and the related literature on the effects of environmental 
policy on the creation of new, environmentally friendly technology.  We conclude with suggestions for 
further research on technological change and the environment. 
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Technological Change and the Environment 
 
Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell, and Robert N. Stavins
∗ 
1. Introduction 
In the last decade, discussions of environmental economics and policy have become 
increasingly permeated by issues related to technological change.  An understanding of the 
process of technological change is important for two broad reasons.  First, the environmental 
impact of social and economic activity is profoundly affected by the rate and direction of 
technological change.  New technologies may create or facilitate increased pollution, or may 
mitigate or replace existing polluting activities.  Further, because many environmental problems 
and policy responses thereto are evaluated over time horizons of decades or centuries, the 
cumulative impact of technological changes is likely to be large.  Indeed, uncertainty about the 
future rate and direction of technological change is often an important sensitivity in “baseline” 
forecasts of the severity of environmental problems.  In global climate change modeling, for 
example, different assumptions about autonomous improvements in energy efficiency are often 
the single largest source of difference among predictions of the cost of achieving given policy 
objectives (Weyant 1993; Energy Modeling Forum1996).   
Second, environmental policy interventions themselves create new constraints and 
incentives that affect the process of technological change.  These induced effects of 
environmental policy on technology may have substantial implications for the normative analysis 
of policy decisions.  They may have quantitatively important consequences in the context of 
cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analyses of such policies.  They may also have broader 
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implications for welfare analyses, because the process of technological change is characterized 
by externalities and market failures with important welfare consequences beyond those 
associated with environmental issues. 
Our goals in this chapter are to summarize for environmental economists current thinking 
on technological change in the broader economics literature; to survey the growing literature on 
the interaction between technology and the environment; and to explore the normative 
implications of these analyses.  This is a large task, inevitably requiring unfortunate but 
necessary omissions.  In particular, we confine ourselves to the relationship between technology 
and problems of environmental pollution, leaving aside a large literature on technological change 
in agriculture and natural resources more broadly.
1  Because of the significant environmental 
implications of fossil fuel combustion, we include in our review some of the relevant literature 
on technological change and energy use.
2 
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the general literature on the economics of 
technological change.  It is intended less as a true survey than as a checklist of issues that the 
interested reader can use to find entry points into the literature.
3  Section 3 discusses invention 
and innovation, including the idea of “induced innovation” whereby environmental policy can 
stimulate the creation of new environmentally friendly technology.  Section 4 focuses on issues 
related to technology diffusion.  Section 5 provides concluding observations and suggestions for 
future research. 
                                                 
1 See the recent surveys by Sunding and Zilberman (2000) and Ruttan (2000). 
2 Because our focus is technological change, we also exclude the growing literature on political and policy 
innovation and the evolution of social norms.  See the chapters on “Political Economy of Environmental Policy” 
and “Property Rights, Public Goods, and the Environment” in this volume. 
3 For surveys of other aspects of the economics of technological change, see Solow (1999) on neoclassical growth 
theory, Grossman and Helpman (1995) on technology and trade, Evenson (1995) on technology and development, 
and Reinganum (1989) on industrial organization theory of innovation and diffusion. Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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2.  Fundamental Concepts in the Economics of Technological Change 
The literature pertaining to the economics of technological change is large and diverse. 
Major sub-areas (with references to surveys related to those areas) include: the theory of 
incentives for research and development (Tirole 1988; Reinganum 1989; Geroski 1995); the 
measurement of innovative inputs and outputs (Griliches 1984 and Griliches 1998); analysis and 
measurement of externalities resulting from the research process (Griliches 1992; Jaffe 1998a); 
the measurement and analysis of productivity growth (Jorgenson 1990; Griliches 1998; 
Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000); diffusion of new technology (Karshenas and Stoneman 1995; 
Geroski 2000); the effect of market structure on innovation (Scherer 1986; Sutton 1998); market 
failures related to innovation and appropriate policy responses (Martin and Scott 2000); the 
economic effects of publicly funded research (David et al. 2000); the economic effects of the 
patent system (Jaffe 2000); and the role of technological change in endogenous macroeconomic 
growth (Romer 1994; Grossman and Helpman 1994).  In this section, we present a selective 
overview designed to provide entry points into this large literature. 
2.1. Schumpeter and the Gale of Creative Destruction 
The modern theory of the process of technological change can be traced to the ideas of 
Josef Schumpeter (1942), who saw innovation as the hallmark of the modern capitalist system.  
Entrepreneurs, enticed by the vision of the temporary market power that a successful new 
product or process could offer, continually introduce such products.  They may enjoy excess 
profits for some period of time, until they are displaced by subsequent successful innovators, in a 
continuing process that Schumpeter called “creative destruction.” 
Schumpeter distinguished three steps or stages in the process by which a new, superior 
technology permeates the marketplace.  Invention constitutes the first development of a Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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scientifically or technically new product or process.
4  Inventions may be patented, though many 
are not.  Either way, most inventions never actually develop into an innovation, which is 
accomplished only when the new product or process is commercialized, that is, made available 
on the market.
5  A firm can innovate without ever inventing, if it identifies a previously existing 
technical idea that was never commercialized, and brings a product or process based on that idea 
to market.  The invention and innovation stages are carried out primarily in private firms through 
a process that is broadly characterized as “research and development” (R&D).
6  Finally, a 
successful innovation gradually comes to be widely available for use in relevant applications 
through adoption by firms or individuals, a process labeled diffusion.  The cumulative economic 
or environmental impact of new technology results from all three of these stages,
7 which we refer 
to collectively as the process of technological change. 
                                                 
4 The Schumpeterian “trichotomy” focuses on the commercial aspects of technological change.  As discussed in 
Section 3.1.2 below, the public sector also plays an important role.  In addition, a non-trivial amount of basic 
research—which one might think of as prior even to the invention stage—is carried out by private firms 
(Rosenberg 1990).  
5 More precisely, an invention may form the basis of a technological innovation.  Economically important 
innovations need not be based on new technology, but can be new organizational or managerial forms, new 
marketing methods, and so forth.  In this chapter, we use the word innovation as short-hand for the more precise 
technological innovation. 
6 Data regarding R&D expenditures of firms are available from the financial statements of publicly traded firms, if 
the expenditure is deemed “material” by the firm’s auditors, or if the firm chooses for strategic reasons to report 
the expenditure (Bound et al. 1984).  In the United States, the government carries out a “census” of R&D activity, 
and reports totals for broad industry groups (National Science Board 1998).  Many industrialized countries now 
collect similar statistics, which are available through the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD 2000). 
7 Typically, for there to be environmental impacts of a new technology, a fourth step is required utilization, but 
that is not part of the process of technological change per se.  Thus, for example, a new type of hybrid motor 
vehicle engine might be invented, which emits fewer pollutants per mile; the same or another firm might 
commercialize this engine and place the innovation in new cars available for purchase on the market; individuals 
might purchase (or adopt) these cars, leading to diffusion of the new technology; and finally, by driving these cars 
instead of others (utilization), aggregate pollutant emissions might be reduced.  Conversely, if higher efficiency 
and the resulting reduced marginal cost causes users to increase utilization, then the emissions reduction associated 
with higher efficiency may be partially or totally offset by higher utilization. Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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2.2. Production Functions, Productivity Growth, and Biased Technological Change 
The measurement of the rate and direction of technological change rests fundamentally 
on the concept of the transformation function, 
  (,, ) 0 TYIt≤ , (1) 
where Y represents a vector of outputs, I represents a vector of inputs, and t is time.  Equation (1) 
describes a production possibility frontier, that is, a set of combinations of inputs and outputs 
that are technically feasible at a point in time.  Technological change is represented by 
movement of this frontier that makes it possible over time to use given input vectors to produce 
output vectors that were not previously feasible. 
In most applications, separability and aggregation assumptions are made that make it 
possible to represent the economy’s production technology with a production function, 
 (,,; ) Yf K L E t = , (2) 
where Y is now a scalar measure of aggregate output (for example, gross domestic product), and 
the list of inputs on the right-hand side of the production function can be made arbitrarily long.  
For illustrative purposes, we conceive of output as being made from a single composite of capital 
goods, K, a single composite of labor inputs, L, and a single composite of environmental inputs, 
E (for example, waste assimilation).  Again, technological change means that the relationship 
between these inputs and possible output levels changes over time. 
Logarithmic differentiation of Equation (2) with respect to time yields 
  ttL t tK t tE t t yA l k e β ββ =+ + + , (3) 
in which lower case letters represent the percentage growth rates of the corresponding upper case 
variable; the β ’s represent the corresponding logarithmic partial derivatives from Equation (2); Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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and the t indicate that all quantities and parameters may change over time.
8  T h e  t e r m  At 
corresponds to “neutral” technological change, in the sense that it represents the rate of growth of 
output if the growth rates of all inputs were zero.  But the possibility that the β ’s can change 
over time allows for “biased” technological change, that is, changes over time in relative 
productivity of the various inputs. 
Equations (2) and (3) are most easily interpreted in the case of process innovation, in 
which firms figure out more efficient ways to make existing products, allowing output to grow at 
a rate faster than inputs are growing.  In principle, these equations also apply to product 
innovation. Y is a composite or aggregate output measure, in which the distinct outputs of the 
economy are each weighted by their relative value, as measured by their market price.  Improved 
products will typically sell at a price premium, relative to lower quality products, meaning that 
their introduction will increase measured output even if the physical quantity of the new goods 
does not exceed the physical quantity of the old goods they replaced.  In practice, however, 
product improvement will be included in measured productivity only to the extent that the price 
indices used to convert nominal GDP or other nominal output measures to real output measures 
are purged of the effects of product innovation.  In general, official price indices and the 
corresponding real output measures achieve this objective only to a limited extent. 
On its face, Equation (3) says nothing about the source of the productivity improvement 
associated with the neutral technological change term, At.   If, however, all inputs and outputs are 
properly measured, and inputs (including R&D) yield only normal investment returns, then all 
endogenous contributions to output should be captured by returns to inputs, and there should be 
                                                 
8 This formulation can be considered a first-order approximation to an arbitrary functional form for Equation (2).  
Higher-order approximations can also be implemented. Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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no “residual” difference between the weighted growth rates of inputs and the growth rate of 
output. The observation that the residual has been typically positive is therefore interpreted as 
evidence of some source of exogenous technological change.
9   
There is now a large literature on the measurement and explanation of the productivity 
residual.  There are two basic approaches to the measurement of productivity.  The “growth 
accounting” approach relies on neoclassical production theory under constant returns to scale for 
the proposition that the β ’s in Equation (3) are equal to the corresponding factor shares, and 
thereby calculates the At as an arithmetic residual after share-weighted input growth rates are 
subtracted from the growth rate of output (Denison 1979; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000).  
The “econometric” approach estimates the parameters of Equation (3) from time series data and 
infers the magnitude of At as an econometric residual after the estimated effects of all measurable 
inputs on output have been allowed for (Jorgenson and Griliches 1967; Jorgenson and Stiroh, 
2000).  In both of these approaches, much attention has focused on the difficulties of 
appropriately measuring both inputs and outputs (Jorgenson and Griliches 1967; Griliches 1994).  
This issue can be particularly problematic for the measurement of natural capital stocks, which 
can lead to bias in the productivity residual if they are ignored or mismeasured (see Dasgupta 
and Mäler (2000) and the chapter on “National Income Accounts and the Environment” in this 
volume). A particular focus has been understanding the slowdown in productivity growth in the 
1970s and 1980s relative to the earlier postwar period, including the role played by rising energy 
prices in that slowdown (Berndt and Wood 1986, Jorgenson 1984).   
                                                 
9 Fabricant (1954) was the first to observe that the growth of conventional inputs explained little of the observed 
growth in output in the twentieth century.  This observation was elaborated by Abramowitz (1956), Kendrick 
(1956) and Solow (1957).  The early writers were clear that the large “residual” of unexplained growth was “a 
measure of our ignorance” (Abramowitz, 1956) rather than a meaningful measure of the rate of technological 
progress.  See Solow (1999) for a survey of neoclassical growth theory. Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
  8
In many contexts, it is difficult to distinguish the effects of innovation and diffusion.  We 
observe improvements in productivity (or other measures of performance) but do not have the 
underlying information necessary to separate such improvements into movements of the 
production frontier and movements of existing firms towards the frontier.  A related issue, and 
one that is often significant for environment-related technological change, is that innovation can 
be undertaken either by the manufacturers or the users of industrial equipment.  In the former 
case, the innovation must typically be embodied in new capital goods, and must then diffuse 
through the population of users via the purchase of these goods, in order to affect productivity or 
environmental performance.  In the latter case, the innovation may take the form of changes in 
practices that are implemented with existing equipment.  Alternatively, firms may develop new 
equipment for their own use, which they then may or may not undertake to sell to other firms.  
The fact that the locus of activity generating environment-related technological change can be 
supplying firms, using firms, or both, has important consequences for modeling the interaction of 
technological change and environmental policy. 
The embodiment of new technology in new capital goods creates an ambiguity regarding 
the role played by technology diffusion with respect to Equations (2) and (3).  One interpretation 
is that these equations represent “best practice,” that is, what the economy would produce if all 
innovations made to date had fully diffused.  In this interpretation, innovation would drive 
technological change captured in Equation (3); the issue of diffusion would then arise in the form 
of the presence of firms producing at points inside the production possibility frontier.  Frontier 
estimation techniques (Aigner and Schmidt 1980) or data envelopment methods (Fare et al. Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
  9
1994) would be needed to measure the extent to which such sub-frontier behavior is occurring.
10  
Alternatively, one can assume that the users of older equipment make optimal, informed 
decisions regarding when to scrap old machines and purchase newer ones that embody better 
technology.  In this formulation, observed movements of the frontier—measured technological 
change—comprise the combined impacts of the invention, innovation and diffusion processes. 
2.3. Technological Change and Endogenous Economic Growth 
In the last two decades there has emerged a large macroeconomic literature that builds on 
the above concepts to produce models of overall economic growth based on technological 
change (Romer 1990, 1994; Grossman and Helpman 1994; Solow 2000).  In these models, R&D 
is an endogenous equilibrium response to Schumpeterian profit incentives.  Spillovers associated 
with this R&D generate a form of dynamic increasing returns, which allows an economy 
endogenously investing in R&D to grow indefinitely.
11  This stands in contrast to the older 
neoclassical growth model, in which exogenous technological change, in the presence of 
decreasing returns to investment in physical capital, typically yields an economy that tends 
towards a steady state in which income per capita does not grow.
12 
Endogenous growth theory has played an important role in re-introducing technological 
change—and the associated policy issues deriving from R&D market failures—into discussions 
                                                 
10 Boyd and McClelland (1999) and Boyd and Pang (2000) employ data envelopment analysis to evaluate the 
potential for improvements at paper and glass plants that increase productivity and reduce pollution. 
11 It is also possible to generate such endogenous growth through human capital investment (Lucas 1988). 
12 Thus, in the literature, “endogenous technological change” and “induced technological change” refer to different 
concepts, even though the opposite of each is often described by the same phrase, that is, exogenous technological 
change.  Endogenous technological change refers to the broad concept that technological change is the result of 
activities within the economic system, which are presumed to respond to the economic incentives of the system.  
Induced technological change refers to the more specific idea that changes in relative factor prices affect the rate 
and direction of innovation.  In practice, papers that use the phrase “endogenous technological change” tend to 
focus on aggregate R&D expenditure and neutral technological change.  Papers that used the phrase “induced Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
  10
about economic growth.
13  Modeling growth as a process driven by the endogenous creation and 
diffusion of new technology ought to have implications for important environmental issues such 
as sustainable development and global climate change.  Its policy utility has been limited, 
however, by its relative lack of empirical foundation, and by the difficulty of linking the 
macroeconomic endogenous growth models to the microeconomic foundations of technological 
innovation and diffusion (Caballero and Jaffe 1993; Aghion and Howitt, 1998).  This remains an 
important area for future research. 
3.  Invention and Innovation 
As discussed in the introduction, if the imposition of environmental requirements can 
stimulate invention and innovation that reduces the (static) cost of complying with those 
requirements, this has profound implications for both the setting of environmental policy goals 
and the choice of policy instruments.  Nonetheless, there has been some tendency to treat 
technology as a “black box” (Rosenberg 1982). For example, the production 
function/productivity growth paradigm described in Section 2 says little about what generates 
technological change. But following Schumpeter, there has been a line of theoretical and 
empirical analysis that has cast invention and innovation as a purposive economic activity, and 
has attempted to discern its determinants and effects.  Milestones in this line of research are:  
Schmookler 1966; Mansfield 1968; Rosenberg 1982; Griliches 1984; Nelson and Winter 1982; 
and Scherer 1986.
14 
                                                                                                                                                             
technological change” or “induced innovation” tend to focus on the direction of R&D efforts and biases in 
technological change. 
13 See, for example, Jones and Williams (1998), and the symposium on “New Growth Theory” in the Winter 1994 
issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives. 
14 See also the survey by Thirtle and Ruttan (1987). Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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It is useful to identify two major strands of thought regarding the determinants of 
innovative activity.  We call these two broad categories of modeling approaches the “induced 
innovation” approach and the “evolutionary” approach.
15  We now describe the induced 
innovation approach, while the evolutionary approach is discussed in Section 3.4. 
3.1. The induced innovation approach 
3.1.1.  Neoclassical induced innovation 
The recognition that R&D is a profit-motivated investment activity leads to the 
hypothesis that the rate and direction of innovation are likely to respond to changes in relative 
prices.  Since environmental policy implicitly or explicitly makes environmental inputs more 
expensive, the “induced innovation” hypothesis suggests an important pathway for the 
interaction of environmental policy and technology, and for the introduction of impacts on 
technological change as a criterion for evaluation of different policy instruments.   
The induced-innovation hypothesis was first articulated by Sir John Hicks: 
“a change in the relative prices of the factors of production is itself a spur to invention, 
and to invention of a particular kind — directed to economizing the use of a factor which 
has become relatively expensive.” (Hicks 1932, p. 124)
16 
Analysis of this hypothesis has a long and somewhat tortured history in economics.  Early 
empirical work was largely confined to aggregate data, and focused primarily on questions such 
as whether historical cross-country differences in wage levels could explain the location of 
development of labor-saving inventions (Thirtle and Ruttan 1987). 
                                                 
15 In this section and Section 4, we focus separately on induced innovation and the economic forces driving 
diffusion.  As noted above, however, the analytical distinction between innovation and diffusion is blurred in 
practice. 
16 Writing before Schumpeter, Hicks does not appear to use the word “invention” in the specific sense used by 
Schumpeter and adopted by later authors.  Rather, Hicks uses it in a general sense encompassing both invention 
and innovation, as used today. Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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Hicks did not link the induced-innovation hypothesis in a formal way to the research 
process, or to profit-maximizing R&D decisions by firms.  This link was formalized in the 1960s 
by Ahmad (1966) and Kamien and Schwartz (1968), and developed further by Binswanger 
(1974).  Binswanger and Ruttan (1978) summarize this literature.  The general approach is to 
postulate a “meta” production function according to which investing in R&D changes the 
parameters of a production function such as Equation (2).  Unfortunately, theoretical conclusions 
regarding the induced affect of changes in factor prices on the parameters of the production 
function are sensitive to the specification of the “meta” production function governing the 
research process. 
Although formulated in terms of the R&D decisions of firms, this theory is nonetheless 
aggregate, because the result of the research process is change in the parameters of the aggregate 
production function.  That is, “labor-saving” innovation in these models means a change in the 
parameters of Equation (2) that results in less labor being used.  The model abstracts entirely 
from what kinds of new machines or processes might be yielding these changes.  Further, 
because of the ambiguity described in Section 2.2 as to whether the production frontier does or 
does not encompass technology diffusion, there is really no distinction in these models between 
induced innovation and the effect of factor prices on the rate of technology diffusion. 
A natural way to move the modeling of induced innovation to the microeconomic level is 
to recognize that factor-saving technological change comes about largely through the 
introduction of new capital goods that embody different input ratios.  These input ratios can then 
be thought of as attributes or characteristics of the capital goods in the sense of Lancaster (1971).   
Thirtle and Ruttan (1987) provided a review of the non-environmental literature on induced 
innovation.  Much of this work is in the agricultural area in which excellent microdata has long Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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provided fertile ground for empirical work on innovation and diffusion.
17  In general, available 
empirical analyses confirm that factor price changes are associated with factor-saving 
technological change. 
3.1.2.  Market failures and policy responses 
Within the induced innovation approach, firms undertake an investment activity called 
“R&D” with the intention of producing profitable new products and processes.  Decisions 
regarding the magnitude and nature of R&D activities are governed by firms’ efforts to 
maximize their value, or, equivalently, to maximize the expected discounted present value of 
cash flows.  In some applications, the output of R&D is explicitly modeled as “knowledge 
capital,” an intangible asset that firms use together with other assets and other inputs to generate 
revenues.
18 
When viewed as an investment activity, R&D has important characteristics that 
distinguish it from investment in equipment or other tangible assets.  First, although the outcome 
of any investment is uncertain to some extent, R&D investment appears to be qualitatively 
different.  Not only is the variance of the distribution of expected returns much larger than for 
other investments, but much or even most of the value may be associated with very low-
probability but very high value outcomes (Scherer et al. 2000).  This skewness in the distribution 
of the outcomes of the research process has important implications for modeling firms’ R&D 
decision making (Scherer and Harhoff, 2000).  In addition, the asset produced by the R&D 
investment process is specialized, sunk and intangible, so that it cannot be mortgaged or used as 
                                                 
17 More recently, the availability of computerized firm-level data on R&D and patents has led to an increase in 
parallel analyses in the industrial sector. 
18 See Griliches (1979) for the seminal statement of this research approach.  An example of a recent application 
measuring the knowledge capital of firms is Hall et al. (2000). Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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collateral.  The combination of great uncertainty and intangible outcomes makes financing of 
research through capital market mechanisms much more difficult than for traditional investment. 
The difficulty of securing financing for research from outside sources may lead to under-
investment in research, particularly for small firms that have less internally generated cash and/or 
less access to financial markets. 
In addition to these financing difficulties, research investment differs from physical 
investment because the asset produced by the research process — new knowledge about how to 
make and do things — is difficult to exclude others from using.  As first noted in the classic 
paper by Arrow (1962a), this means that the creator of this asset will typically fail to appropriate 
all or perhaps most of the social returns it generates.  Much of this social return will accrue as 
“spillovers” to competing firms, to downstream firms that purchase the innovator’s products, or 
to consumers  (Griliches 1979, 1992; Jaffe 1986, 1998a).  This “appropriability problem” is 
likely to lead to significant underinvestment by private firms in R&D, relative to the social 
optimum (Spence 1984).
19 
                                                 
19 The recognition that the costs and benefits of R&D for the firm are affected by the appropriability problem and 
financing issues has led to a large literature on the effects of market structure on innovation.  In the older literature, 
it was argued that both these problems would be overcome more easily by large firms and/or firms operating in 
concentrated industries characterized by market power.  From these observations, it was hypothesized that 
innovation comes disproportionately from large firms and concentrated industries.  This conjecture is known as the 
“Schumpeterian Hypothesis.” After much debate about what the Schumpeterian Hypothesis really means, the 
volume of evidence seems to show that:  (1) much innovation comes from large firms in moderately concentrated 
industries, if only because much economic activity comes from such firms; (2) truly competitive industries (for 
example, construction) perform little R&D; (3) beyond minimal size and concentration, there is little evidence of 
any monotonic relationship between innovation intensity and either size or concentration; and (4) innovation and 
market structure interact dynamically in a way that is not captured by an alleged causal influence of firm size and 
market concentration on innovation. For an extensive survey of this literature, see Cohen and Levin (1989).  More 
recently, a large game-theoretic literature related to strategic R&D incentives has emerged (surveyed by 
Reinganum 1989).  This literature has two strands.  One views R&D or other innovative activities in a context of 
continuous competition in which, for example, marginal R&D investments result in marginal cost reductions or 
product improvements (for example, Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980a; Levin and Reiss 1988; Spence 1984).  The other 
R&D theory literature focuses on patent races, where firms compete to be the first to achieve a specific innovation 
goal (for example, Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980b; Reinganum 1982; Fudenberg et al. 1983). Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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An important special case of the appropriability problem is created by “general purpose 
technologies” (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995).  GPTs are technologies that find use in many 
distinct application sectors within the economy, such as the electric motor, the steam engine, the 
internal combustion engine and now, the semiconductor and possibly the Internet.  The 
development of such technologies increases the returns to R&D designed to incorporate them 
into the different applications sectors; development of such applications in turn increases the 
return to improving the GPT.  Because of these dynamic feedback effects, GPTs may be an 
important factor in economic growth (Helpman, 1998).  The dynamic feedback between a GPT 
and its applications sectors also creates an important example of “path dependence,” discussed in 
Section 4 below.  With respect to the environment, whether the GPTs that drive a particular era 
are pollution-intensive or pollution-saving may have profound implications for the long-term 
environmental prognosis. 
As a profit-motivated activity, R&D investment decisions are governed by the cost of 
R&D and its expected return.  Theory and evidence suggest that the most important factors 
affecting the optimal level of R&D are the after-tax cost of R&D (Hall and van Reenen 2000), 
the size of the market (Schmookler 1966), technological opportunity (Rosenberg 1982), and 
appropriability conditions (Jaffe 1988).  Each of these varies intrinsically across time, markets, 
and technologies, and also is affected by government policy.  In particular, patents and other 
forms of intellectual property are used by firms to overcome the appropriability problem, 
although the effect of these institutions on investment in R&D or inventive activity has not been 
clearly demonstrated empirically (Jaffe, 2000: Cohen et al. 2000). 
As noted above, both the appropriability problem and the possibility of capital market 
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innovation will be too low from a social perspective.  There is, however, an offsetting negative 
externality that suggests that private R&D incentives may be too great.  R&D is a fixed cost that 
must, in equilibrium, be financed by the stream of quasi-rents it produces.  The entry of another 
R&D competitor, or an increase in the R&D investment level of a competitor, reduces the 
expected quasi-rents earned by other R&D firms.  This “rent-stealing” effect (Mankiw and 
Whinston 1986) could, as a theoretical matter, lead to over-investment in R&D.  This is 
analogous to the over-fishing of an open-access fishery by a competitive fishing industry.
20 
The empirical evidence suggests, however, that positive externalities associated with 
knowledge spillovers dominate the rent-stealing effect, leading to social rates of return to R&D 
substantially in excess of the private rates of return (Griliches 1992).  In practice, virtually all 
industrialized countries engage in policies designed to encourage investment in innovation 
(Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 2000; Mowery and Rosenberg 1989).  It is difficult to determine 
how well these policies do in moving R&D toward optimal levels.  There is some evidence that 
social rates of return remain well above private levels (Griliches 1992; Jones and Williams 
1998), but there is also evidence that R&D subsidies drive up the wages of scientists enough to 
prevent significant increases in real R&D (Goolsbee 1998).  This implies that the supply of 
scientists and engineers is relatively inelastic; whether such inelasticity could hold in the long 
run remains unresolved. 
Policy can try to increase social investment in R&D by engaging in R&D in the public 
(and/or nonprofit) sector, or by trying to reduce the after-tax cost of R&D for private firms.  
                                                 
20 There is also a dynamic analogue to the tension between spillovers and rent-stealing.  Over time, innovation may 
become cumulatively easier because subsequent inventors “stand on the shoulders” of those who came before; or it 
may become harder, because the pool of potential inventions is “fished out.”  In the 1980s, there was considerable 
interest in the idea that “fishing out” of invention potential may explain the productivity slowdown of the 1970s Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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R&D in the public sector and in universities is an important, though declining component of the 
overall research effort in the U.S. and other developed nations.
21  The evidence on the 
effectiveness of public research is mixed, partly because of the difficulty of measuring the output 
of the basic research process (Jaffe 1998b), and partially because of the difficulty of determining 
the extent of complementarity or substitutability between public research investment and private 
investment (David et al. 2000).  Examples of successful government technology development (as 
opposed to research) have been particularly few (Cohen and Noll 1991).  Nonetheless, public 
R&D may well play a particularly important role with respect to environment-related science and 
technology, since the external social benefits of environmentally benign technology are unlikely 
to be fully captured by private innovators. 
Government policy affects the after-tax cost of R&D via tax incentives (Hall and Van 
Reneen (2000),
22 direct subsidies and grants for research (Klette et al. 2000; Trajtenberg 2000), 
and also via educational policies that affect the supply of scientists and engineers (Romer 2000).  
Public policies can affect the market for new technologies via direct government purchase, 
subsidies for purchase or installation of products incorporating particular technologies,   
(Stoneman 1987), and also disincentives against the adoption of competing technologies 
(pollution fees, for example). Finally, policies can affect the extent to which firms can 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Evenson 1991).  But the surge in patenting and productivity growth rates in the 1990s has led to a fading of the 
fishing-out idea (Jaffe, 2000). 
21 Research performed in government labs, universities and other non-profit institutions is currently about one-fourth 
of all research performed in the U.S., versus three-quarters performed in the for-profit sector.  In addition, some of 
the research performed by firms is funded by public money; altogether, over one-third of all R&D is funded by 
public sources (National Science Board, 1998).  This estimate excludes the implicit public subsidy for private 
research represented by the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit. 
22 The effect of taxation on R&D incentives is theoretically complex.  On the one hand, any tax on profits derived 
from R&D drives a wedge between the before- and after-tax returns and hence discourages R&D investment.  On 
the other hand, returns from R&D are taxed much more lightly than returns from investment in equipment and 
structures, both because of explicit R&D incentives, and also because R&D can be expensed rather than 
amortized.  Thus relative to traditional investment, R&D is strongly tax-preferred. Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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successfully appropriate the returns to their research, by establishing the institutional 
environment of patent systems, employment relations, and antitrust or other competition 
policies.
23 
3.1.3.  Empirical evidence on induced innovation in pollution abatment and energy 
conservation 
The greatest challenge in testing the induced innovation hypothesis specifically with 
respect to environmental inducement is the difficulty of measuring the extent or intensity of 
inducement across firms or industries (Jaffe, et al. 1995).  Ideally, one would like to look at the 
relationship between innovation and the shadow price of pollution or environmental inputs.  In 
practice, such shadow prices are not easily observed.  Consequently, one must use proxies for 
this shadow price, such as characteristics of environmental regulations, expenditures on pollution 
abatement, or prices of polluting inputs (for example, energy).  In the following paragraphs, we 
review in turn studies that have used each of these approaches.   
There is a large literature on the impact of environmental regulation on productivity and 
investment.
24  To the extent that regulation inhibits investment and/or slows productivity growth, 
this can be viewed as indirect evidence suggesting that induced innovation effects are either 
small or are outweighed by other costs of regulation.  Results of this type seem to be industry 
and methodology dependent.  For measuring the characteristics of environmental regulations, 
studies have used expert judgements about relative regulatory stringency in different states (Gray 
and Shadbegian 1998), number of enforcement actions (Gray and Shadbegian 1995), attainment 
                                                 
23 The primary explicit non-fiscal mechanism for encouraging innovation in industrialized countries is the patent 
system.  Empirical evidence on the impact of patent protection on the rate of innovation is ambiguous.  For a 
survey, see Jaffe (2000). 
24 See, for example, Gollop and Roberts (1983), Kolstad and Turnovsky (1998) and Yaisawarng and Klein (1994). 
This literature is discussed at greater length in the chapter on “Calculating the Costs of Environmental Regulation” 
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status with respect to environmental laws and regulations (Greenstone 1998), and specific 
regulatory events (Berman and Bui 1998).
25  For example, Berman and Bui (1998) found 
significant productivity increases associated with air pollution regulation in the oil refining 
industry, but Gray and Shadbegian (1998) found that pollution abatement investment “crowds 
out” productive investment almost entirely in the pulp and paper industry.  Greenstone (1998) 
found overall that air pollution regulation has a statistically significant but very small impact on 
overall costs, implying a small negative productivity impact. 
Lanjouw and Mody (1996) showed a strong association between pollution abatement 
expenditures and the rate of patenting in related technology fields.  Jaffe and Palmer (1997) 
examined the correlation between pollution expenditures by industry and indicators of 
innovation more broadly.  They found that there is a significant correlation within industries over 
time between the rate of expenditure on pollution abatement and the level of R&D spending.  
They did not, however, find evidence of an effect of pollution control expenditure on overall 
patenting. 
Evidence of inducement has also been sought by examining the response to changing 
energy prices.  Newell (1997, Chapter 2) and Newell et al. (1999) examined the extent to which 
the energy efficiency of the menu of home appliances available for sale changed in response to 
energy prices between 1958 and 1993, using a model of induced innovation as changing 
characteristics of capital goods. Hicks formulated the induced innovation hypothesis in terms of 
factor prices.  Newell et al. (1999) generalized this concept to include inducement by regulatory 
standards, such as labeling requirements that might increase the value of certain product 
                                                 
25 Of course, there is a parallel problem with respect to measurement of the rate of invention or innovation.  See 
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characteristics by making consumers more aware of them.  More generally, non-price regulatory 
constraints can fit within the inducement framework if they can be modeled as changing the 
shadow or implicit price that firms face in emitting pollutants.  In their framework, the existing 
technology for making a given type of equipment at a point in time is identified in terms of 
vectors of characteristics (including cost of manufacture) that are feasible.  The process of 
invention makes it possible to manufacture “models” (characteristics vectors) that were 
previously infeasible.  Innovation means the offering for commercial sale of a model that was not 
previously offered for sale.  Induced innovation is then represented as movements in the frontier 
of feasible models that reduce the cost of energy efficiency in terms of other attributes.  
By constructing a series of dynamic simulations, they examined the effects of energy 
price changes and efficiency standards on average efficiency of the menu of products over time.  
They found that a substantial amount of the improvement was what may be described as 
autonomous (that is, associated with the passage of time), but significant amounts of innovation 
were also due to changes in energy prices and changes in energy-efficiency standards. They 
found that technological change in air conditioners was actually biased against energy efficiency 
in the 1960s (when real energy prices were falling), but that this bias was reversed after the two 
energy shocks of the 1970s.  In terms of the efficiency of the average model offered, they found 
that energy efficiency in 1993 would have been about one-quarter to one-half lower in air 
conditioners and gas water heaters, if energy prices had stayed at their 1973 levels, rather than 
following their historical path. Most of the response to energy price changes came within less 
than five years of those changes. 
Popp (2001a and 2001b) looked more broadly at energy prices and energy-related 
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response to increased energy prices, with most of the effect occurring within a few years, and 
then fading over time.  Popp attributed this fading to diminishing returns to R&D.  In the second 
paper, he attempted to decompose the overall reduction in energy use that is associated with 
changing energy prices between the substitution effect—movements along a given production 
frontier—and the induced innovation effect—movement of the production frontier itself induced 
by the change in energy prices.  Using energy-related patents as a proxy for energy innovation, 
he found that approximately one-third of the overall response of energy use to prices is 
associated with induced innovation, with the remaining two-thirds associated with factor 
substitution.  Because energy patents are likely to measure energy innovation only with 
substantial error, one might interpret this result as placing a lower bound on the fraction of the 
overall response of energy use to changing prices that is associated with innovation. 
3.2. Effects of instrument choice on invention and innovation 
The effect of environmental policies on the development and spread of new technologies 
may, in the long run, be among the most important determinants of success or failure in 
environmental protection (Kneese and Schultze 1975).
26  It has long been recognized that 
alternative types of environmental policy instruments can have significantly different effects on 
the rate and direction of technological change (Orr 1976).  Environmental policies, particularly 
those with large economic impacts (for example, those intended to address global climate 
change) can be designed to foster rather than inhibit technological invention, innovation, and 
diffusion (Kempe and Soete 1990). 
                                                 
26 Whereas we focus in this section of the chapter on the effects of environmental policy instruments on 
technological change, it is also the case that exogenous technological change can differentially affect the 
performance of alternative environmental policy instruments.  For example, technological change in monitoring 
and enforcement, such as improvements in remote-sensing of motor vehicle emissions, could render particular 
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3.2.1.  Categories of environmental policy instruments and criteria for comparison 
For purposes of examining the link between environmental policy instruments and 
technological change, policies can be characterized as either command-and-control or market-
based approaches.  Market-based instruments are mechanisms that encourage behavior through 
market signals rather than through explicit directives regarding pollution control levels or 
methods.  These policy instruments — such as pollution charges, subsidies, tradeable permits, 
and some types of information programs — have been described as “harnessing market forces.”  
This is because if they are well designed and implemented, they encourage firms (and/or 
individuals) to undertake pollution control efforts that are in their own interests and that 
collectively meet policy goals.
27 
Conventional approaches to regulating the environment are often referred to as 
“command-and-control” regulations, since they allow relatively little flexibility in the means of 
achieving goals.  Such regulations tend to force firms to take on similar shares of the pollution-
control burden, regardless of the cost.  Command-and-control regulations do this by setting 
uniform standards for firms, the most prevalent of which are performance- and technology-based 
standards.  A performance standard sets a uniform control target for firms (emissions per unit of 
output, for example), while allowing some latitude in how this target is met. Technology-based 
standards specify the method, and sometimes the actual equipment, that firms must use to 
comply with a particular regulation. 
Holding all firms to the same target can be expensive and, in some circumstances, 
counterproductive.  While standards may effectively limit emissions of pollutants, they typically 
exact relatively high costs in the process, by forcing some firms to resort to unduly expensive 
means of controlling pollution. Because the costs of controlling emissions may vary greatly 
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among firms, and even among sources within the same firm,
28 the appropriate technology in one 
situation may not be appropriate (cost-effective) in another. 
  All of these forms of intervention have the potential for inducing or forcing some 
amount of technological change, because by their very nature they induce or require firms to do 
things they would not otherwise do.  Performance and technology standards can be explicitly 
designed to be "technology forcing," mandating performance levels that are not currently viewed 
as technologically feasible or mandating technologies that are not fully developed. One problem 
with these approaches, however, is that while regulators can typically assume that some amount 
of improvement over existing technology will always be feasible, it is impossible to know how 
much.  Standards must either be made unambitious, or else run the risk of being ultimately 
unachievable, leading to great political and economic disruption (Freeman and Haveman 1972). 
Technology standards are particularly problematic, since they tend to freeze the 
development of technologies that might otherwise result in greater levels of control.  Under 
regulations that are targeted at technologies, as opposed to emissions levels, no financial 
incentive exists for businesses to exceed control targets, and the adoption of new technologies is 
discouraged.  Under a “Best Available Control Technology” (BACT) standard, a business that 
adopts a new method of pollution abatement may be “rewarded” by being held to a higher 
standard of performance and thereby not benefit financially from its investment, except to the 
extent that its competitors have even more difficulty reaching the new standard (Hahn and 
Stavins 1991).  On the other hand, if third parties can invent and patent better equipment, they 
can — in theory — have a ready market.  Under such conditions, a BACT type of standard can 
provide a positive incentive for technology innovation.  Unfortunately, as we note below, there 
has been very little theoretical or empirical analysis of such technology-forcing regulations. 
                                                 
28 Control costs can vary enormously due to a firm’s production design, physical configuration, inputs, age of assets, 
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In contrast with such command-and-control regulations, market-based instruments can 
provide powerful incentives for companies to adopt cheaper and better pollution-control 
technologies.  This is because with market-based instruments, it pays firms to clean up a bit more 
if a sufficiently low-cost method (technology or process) of doing so can be identified and 
adopted. 
In theory, the relative importance of the dynamic effects of alternative policy instruments 
on technological change (and hence long-term compliance costs) is greater in the case of those 
environmental problems which are of great magnitude (in terms of anticipated abatement costs) 
and/or very long time horizon.
29  Hence, the increased attention that is being given by scholars 
and by policy makers to the problem of global climate change
30 has greatly increased the 
prominence of the issues that are considered in this part of the chapter. 
There are two principal ways in which environmental policy instruments can be 
compared with regard to their effects on technological change.  First and foremost, scholars have 
asked — both with theoretical models and with empirical analyses — the most direct question:  
what effects do particular instruments have on the rate and direction of relevant technological 
change?  In keeping with the Schumpeterian trichotomy identified above, such investigations can 
be carried out with reference to the pace of invention, innovation, or diffusion of new 
technologies. 
It is also possible to ask whether environmental policies encourage efficient rates (and 
directions) of technological change, or more broadly, whether such policies result in overall 
economic efficiency (that is, whether the efficient degree of environmental protection is 
achieved).  This second principal mode for comparison is linked more directly with criteria 
                                                 
29 Parry et al. (2000) showed that the importance of the welfare gains from cost-reducing technological change 
relative to the welfare gains from optimal pollution control using existing technology tends to be higher when 
marginal benefits are flatter, marginal costs are steeper (and optimal abatement is lower), the discount rate is 
lower, the rate of technological change is faster, and research costs are lower.  
30See the chapter on “The Economics of Climate Policy” in this volume.  For particular attention to the links 
between technological change and global climate policy, see:  Jaffe et al. (1999). Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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associated with welfare economics, but such comparisons have been made much less frequently 
than have direct assessments of technology effects.  Within the limits of the existing literature, 
we consider both sets of  criteria.
31 
Most of the work in the economics literature on the dynamic effects of environmental 
policy instruments on technological change has been theoretical, rather than empirical, and so we 
consider the theoretical literature first. 
3.2.2. Theoretical  Analyses 
Although, as we suggested above, decisions about technology commercialization are 
partly a demand-side function of anticipated sales (adoption), the relevant literature comparing 
the effects of alternative environmental policy instruments has given greater attention to the 
supply side, focusing on incentives for firm-level decisions to incur R&D costs in the face of 
uncertain outcomes.
32  Such R&D can be either inventive or innovative, but the theoretical 
literature in this area makes no particular distinction. 
The earliest work that is directly relevant was by Magat (1978), who compared effluent 
taxes and CAC standards using an innovation possibilities frontier (IPF) model of induced 
innovation, where research can be used to augment capital or labor in a standard production 
function.  He compared the output rate, effluent rate, output-effluent ratio, and bias (in terms of 
labor or capital augmenting technical change), but produced ambiguous results.  Subsequently, 
Magat (1979) compared taxes, subsidies, permits, effluent standards, and technology standards, 
and showed that all but technology standards would induce innovation biased toward emissions 
reduction.
33  In Magat’s model, if taxes and permits are set so that they lead to the same reduction 
                                                 
31 Enforceability of environmental regulations is another criteria for policy choice that it is rarely emphasized in the 
technology literature.  See Macauley and Brennan (1998) for an evaluation of the potential role of remote sensing 
technology in the enforcement of environmental regulations. 
32 See Kemp (1997) for an overview of theoretical models of technology innovation. 
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in emissions as an effluent standard at all points in time, then the three instruments provide the 
same incentives to innovate. 
A considerable amount of theoretical work followed in the 1980’s.  Although much of 
that work characterized its topic as the effects of alternative policy instruments on technology 
innovation, the focus was in fact on effects of policy on technology diffusion.  Hence, we defer 
consideration of those studies to Section 4.3.1 of this chapter. 
Taking a somewhat broader view than most economic studies, Carraro and Siniscalco 
(1994) suggested that environmental policy instruments should be viewed jointly with traditional 
industrial policy instruments in determining the optimal way to attain a given degree of pollution 
abatement.  They showed that innovation subsidies can be used to attain the same environmental 
target, but without the output reductions that result from pollution taxes. Laffont and Tirole 
(1996a) examined how a tradeable permit system could — in theory — be modified to achieve 
desired incentive effects for technological change.  They demonstrated that although spot 
markets for permits cannot induce the socially optimal degree of innovation, futures markets can 
improve the situation (Laffont and Tirole 1996a).
34 
Cadot and Sinclair-Desgagne (1996) posed the following question:  if a potentially 
regulated industry has private information on the costs of technological advances in pollution 
control (frequently a reasonable assumption), then since the industry has an incentive to claim 
that such technologies are prohibitively expensive (even if that is not the case), can the 
government somehow design an incentive scheme that will avoid the problems of this 
information asymmetry?  The authors developed a solution to this game-theoretic problem.  Not 
surprisingly, the scheme involves government issued threats of regulation (which diminish over 
time as the firm completes stages of technology development). 
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It was only recently that theoretical work followed up on Magat’s attempt in the late 
1970’s to rank policy instruments according to their innovation-stimulating effects.  Fischer et al. 
(1998) found that an unambiguous ranking of policy instruments was not possible.  Rather, the 
ranking of policy instruments was shown by the authors to depend on the innovator’s ability to 
appropriate spillover benefits of new technologies to other firms, the costs of innovation, 
environmental benefit functions, and the number of firms producing emissions. 
The basic model consists of three stages.  First, an innovating firm decides how much to 
invest in R&D by setting its marginal cost of innovation equal to the expected marginal benefits.  
Second, polluting firms decide whether or not to adopt the new technology, use an (inferior) 
imitation of it, or do nothing.  Finally, firms minimize pollution control expenditures by setting 
their marginal costs equal to the price of pollution.  Policy instruments affect the innovation 
incentives primarily through three effects: (1) an abatement cost affect, reflecting the extent to 
which innovation reduces the costs of pollution control; (2) an imitation effect, which weakens 
innovation incentives due to imperfect appropriability; and (3) an emissions payment effect, 
which can weaken incentives if innovation reduces firms’ payments for residual emissions. 
There is some variation in this pattern depending on the instrument, as shown in Table 1, which 
summarizes the direction of the three effects under three alternative policy instruments.  The 
ranking of instruments depends on the relative strength of these effects.  
In an analysis that is quite similar in its results to the study by Fischer et al. (1998), Ulph 
(1998) compared the effects of pollution taxes and command-and-control standards, and found 
that increases in the stringency of the standard or tax had ambiguous effects on the level of R&D, 
because environmental regulations have two competing effects:  a direct effect of increasing 
costs, which increases the incentives to invest in R&D in order to develop cost-saving pollution-
abatement methods; and an indirect effect of reducing product output, which reduces the Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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incentive to engage in R&D.
35  Carraro and Soubeyran (1996) compared an emission tax and an 
R&D subsidy, and found that an R&D subsidy is desirable if the output contractions induced by 
the tax are small or if the government finds output contractions undesirable for other reasons.  
Addressing the same trade-off, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996) found that a simultaneous 
tax on pollution emissions and subsidy to environmental R&D may be better suited to 
overcoming the joint market failure (negative externality from pollution and positive externality 
or spillover effects of R&D).
36 
 
Table 1:  Theoretical Determinants of the Incentives for Innovation 





































Finally, Montero (2000) compared instruments under non-competitive circumstances, and 
found that the results are less clear than when perfect competition is assumed.  He modeled a 
two-firm oligopoly facing environmental regulation in the form of emissions standards, freely-
allocated permits, auctioned permits, and taxes.  Firms can invest in R&D to lower their marginal 
abatement costs, and they can also benefit from spillover effects from the other firm’s R&D 
efforts.  In choosing whether and how much to invest in R&D in order to maximize profits, a 
                                                 
35In addition, Ulph (1998) examined a situation where two firms produce identical products with two characteristics.  
If both firms innovate on the same characteristic, price competition will eliminate any gains from R&D; but 
consumer pressure can affect the direction of R&D by influencing the characteristic that firms focus on improving.  
See also:  Ulph and Ulph (1996). 
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firm must consider two effects of its investment choice:  (1) the increase in profits due to a 
decrease in its abatement costs (less the R&D cost); and (2) the decrease in profits due to 
changes in the other firm’s output, as a result of spillover from the first firm’s R&D.  The result 
is that standards and taxes yield higher incentives for R&D when the market is characterized by 
Cournot competition, but the opposite holds when the market is characterized by Bertrand 
competition. 
 
3.2.3. Empirical  Analyses 
There has been exceptionally little empirical analysis of the effects of alternative policy 
instruments on technology innovation in pollution abatement, principally because of the paucity 
of available data.  One study by Bellas (1998) carried out a statistical analysis of the costs of flue 
gas desulfurization (scrubbing) installed at coal-fired power plants in the United States under the 
new-source performance standards of the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Acts.  Bellas failed to find 
any evidence of effects of scrubber vintage on cost, suggesting little technological change had 
taken place under this regulatory regime. 
  Although there has been very little analysis in the context of pollution-abatement 
technologies, there is a more extensive literature on the effects of alternative policy instruments 
on the innovation of energy-efficiency technologies, because data have been available.  As 
described in Section 3.1.3, above, the innovation process can be thought of as affecting 
improvements in the characteristics of products on the market, and the process can be framed as 
the shifting inward over time of a frontier representing the tradeoffs between different product 
characteristics for the range of models available on the market.  If one axis is the cost of the 
product and another axis is the energy flow associated with a product, that is, its energy intensity, 
then innovation is represented by inward shifts of the curve — greater energy efficiency at the Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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same cost, or lower cost for given energy efficiency.  With this approach, Newell, et. al (1999) 
assessed the effects of changes in energy prices and in energy-efficiency standards in stimulating 
innovation.  Energy price changes induced both commercialization of new models and 
elimination of old models.  Regulations, however, worked largely through energy-inefficient 
models being dropped, since that is the intended effect of the energy-efficiency standards 
(models below a certain energy efficiency level may not be offered for sale). 
A closely related approach to investigating the same phenomena is that of hedonic price 
functions.  One hedonic study examined the effects of public policies in the context of home 
appliances.  Greening et al. (1997) estimated the impacts of the 1990 and 1993 national 
efficiency standards on the quality-adjusted price of household refrigerator/freezer units.  They 
found that quality-adjusted prices fell after the implementation of the energy efficiency 
standards, but such quality-adjusted price decreases are consistent with historical trends in 
refrigerator/freezer prices.  Hence, one cannot rule out the possibility that the imposition of 
efficiency standards slowed the rate of quality-adjusted price decline. 
Given the attention paid to automobile fuel economy over the past two decades, it is not 
surprising that several hedonic studies of automobiles have addressed or focused on energy-
efficiency, including Ohta and Griliches (1976) and Goodman (1983).  Atkinson and Halvorsen 
(1984) found that the fuel efficiency of the new car fleet responds more than proportionally to 
changes in expected fuel prices.  Using an analogue to the hedonic price technique, Wilcox 
(1984) constructed a quality-adjusted measure of automobile fuel economy over the period 
1952–1980, finding that it was positively related to oil prices.  Ohta and Griliches (1986) found 
that gasoline price changes over the period 1970–1981 could alone explain much of the observed 
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Greene (1990) used data on fuel prices and fuel economy of automobiles from 1978 to 
1989 to test the relative effectiveness of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards 
and gasoline prices in increasing fuel economy.  He found that the big three U.S. firms faced a 
binding CAFE constraint, and for these firms compliance with CAFE standards had roughly 
twice the impact on fuel economy as did fuel prices.  Japanese firms, however, did not face a 
binding CAFE constraint, and fuel prices had only a small effect. Luxury European manufactures 
seemed to base their fuel efficiency largely on market demand and often exceeded CAFE 
requirements.  For these firms, neither the standards nor prices seemed to have much effects. 
More recently, Pakes, et. al (1993) investigated the effects of gasoline prices on the fuel 
economy of motor vehicles offered for sale, and found that the observed increase in miles per 
gallon (mpg) from 1977 onward was largely due to the consequent change in the mix of vehicles 
on the market.  Fewer low-mpg cars were marketed, and more high-mpg cars were marketed.  
Subsequently, Berry et al. (1996) combined plant-level cost data for the automobile industry and 
information on the characteristics of models that were produced at each plant to estimate a 
hedonic cost function — the supply-side component of the hedonic price function — finding that 
quality-adjusted costs generally increased over the period 1972–1982, thus coinciding with 
rising gasoline prices and emission standards. 
Finally, Goldberg (1998) combined a demand-side model of discrete vehicle choice and 
utilization with a supply-side model of oligopoly and product differentiation to estimate the 
effects of CAFE standards on the fuel economy of the new car fleet.  She found that automobile 
fuel operating costs have had a significant effect, although a gasoline tax of a magnitude that 
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3.3. Induced innovation and optimal environmental policy 
Though the magnitude of induced innovation effects remains uncertain, a few researchers 
have begun to explore the consequences of induced innovation for environmental policy.   
Section 3.2, above, addressed the important question of how considerations related to induced 
innovation affect the normative choice among different policy instruments.  In this section, we 
consider the larger question of whether the possibility of induced innovation ought to change 
environmental policy targets, or the pace at which we seek to achieve them. 
Intuitively, it seems logical that if environmental policy intervention induces innovation, 
this in some sense reduces the social cost of environmental intervention, suggesting that the 
optimal policy is more stringent than it would be if there were no induced innovation.  This 
intuition contains an element of truth, but a number of complexities arise.  First, one has to be 
careful what is meant by “reducing the cost of intervention.”  As shown by Goulder and 
Schneider (1999), if the policy intervention induces a reduction in the marginal cost of 
abatement, then any given policy target (for example, a particular aggregate emission rate or a 
particular ambient concentration) will be achieved at lower cost than it would without induced 
innovation.  On the other hand, the lower marginal abatement cost schedule arising from induced 
innovation makes it socially optimal to achieve a greater level of pollution abatement.  For a flat 
marginal social benefit function evaluated at the social optimum, or for any emission tax, this 
results in greater total expenditure on abatement even as the marginal abatement cost falls. 
Another important issue is the general equilibrium effect of induced environmental 
innovation on innovation elsewhere in the economy (Schmalensee 1994).  If inducement 
operates through increased R&D expenditure, then an issue arises as to the elasticity of supply of 
R&D inputs.  To the extent that this supply is inelastic, then any induced innovation must come 
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  33
“innovation offsets” observed in the regulated portion of the economy.
37  The general equilibrium 
consequences of these effects for welfare analysis depend on the extent of R&D spillovers or 
other market failures, and the magnitude of these distortions in the regulated firms or sectors 
relative to the rest of the economy (Goulder and Schneider 1999). 
Goulder and Mathai (2000) looked at optimal carbon abatement in a dynamic setting, 
considering not only the optimal overall amount of abatement but also its timing.
38  In addition to 
R&D-induced innovation, they considered (in a separate model) reductions in abatement costs 
that come about via learning-by-doing.  In the R&D model, there are two effects of induced 
innovation on optimal abatement:  it reduces marginal abatement costs, which increases the 
optimal amount of abatement.  But it also increases the cost of abatement today relative to the 
future, because of lower abatement costs in the future.  The combination of these effects implies 
that with R&D-induced innovation, optimal abatement is lower in early years and higher in later 
years than it would otherwise be. In the learning-by-doing model, there is a third effect:   
abatement today lowers the cost of abatement in the future.  This reinforces the tendency for 
cumulative optimal abatement to be higher in the presence of induced innovation, but makes the 
effect on optimal near-term abatement ambiguous. 
Goulder and Mathai also considered the impact of innovation on the optimal tax rate.  
One might suppose that the potential for induced technological change justifies a higher 
environmental tax rate (or higher time-profile for an environmental tax), since in this setting 
environmental taxes have a dual role:  discouraging emissions and triggering new technologies.  
                                                 
37 Goolsbee (1998) provided evidence that the supply of R&D inputs (scientists and engineers) is relatively inelastic 
in the short run.  It seems less likely that this supply is inelastic in the long run.  See Romer (2000). 
38 On the role of induced technological change in climate change modeling, see also Wigley et al. (1996), Ha-Duong 
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Goulder and Mathai showed, however, that under typical conditions (a downward-sloping 
marginal damages curve) the presence of induced innovation implies a lower time-profile for the 
optimal environmental tax.  The reason is that with induced innovation, a lower tax is all that is 
needed to achieve the desired abatement, even when the desired extent of abatement is higher. 
Nordhaus (2000) introduced induced technological change into the “DICE” model of 
global climate change and associated economic activities.  To calibrate the model, he needed 
parametric estimates of the private and social returns to fossil-fuel-related R&D.  Using the 
existing R&D intensity of the fossil sector to derive these parameters, he found that the impact of 
induced innovation is modest.  Essentially, the existing share of R&D investment in this sector is 
so small that even with large social returns the overall impact is modest.  Indeed, comparing a 
model with induced innovation (but no factor substitution) with a model that has factor 
substitution but no induced innovation, he concluded that induced innovation has less effect than 
factor substitution on optimal emissions levels. 
Overall, there is considerable ambiguity regarding the importance of induced innovation 
for the optimal stringency of environmental policy.  Partly, this is because predictions depend on 
the magnitudes of parameters that are hard to measure.  But, more fundamentally, if 
environmental policy affects the innovation process, and the innovation process is itself 
characterized by market failure, then this is a classic problem of the “second best.”  We know 
that robust results are generally hard to come by with respect to such problems.  It will typically 
make a big difference whether we imagine optimizing R&D policy first, and then environmental 
policy, or vice versa, or if we imagine simultaneous optimization in both realms, or if we assume 
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Theory may be able to indicate the considerations that come into play, but is unlikely to provide 
robust prescriptions for policy. 
3.4. The evolutionary approach to innovation 
While viewing R&D as a profit-motivated investment activity comes naturally to most 
economists, the large uncertainties surrounding the outcomes of R&D investments make it very 
difficult for firms to make optimizing R&D decisions.  Accordingly, Nelson and Winter (1982) 
used Herbert Simon’s idea of boundedly rational firms that engage in “satisficing” rather than 
optimizing behavior (Simon 1947) to build an alternative model of the R&D process.  In this 
“evolutionary” model, firms use “rules of thumb” and “routines” to determine how much to 
invest in R&D, and how to search for new technologies.  The empirical predictions of this model 
depend on the nature of the rules of thumb that firms actually use (Nelson and Winter 1982; 
Winter et al 2000). 
Because firms are not optimizing, a logical consequence of the evolutionary model is that 
it cannot be presumed that the imposition of a new external constraint (for example, a new 
environmental rule) necessarily reduces profits.  There is at least the theoretical possibility that 
the imposition of such a constraint could be an event that forces a satisficing firm to rethink its 
strategy, with the possible outcome being the discovery of a new way of operating that is 
actually more profitable for the firm.  This possibility of environmental regulation leading to a 
“win-win” outcome in which pollution is reduced and profits increased is discussed below. 
3.4.1.  Porter’s “win-win” hypothesis 
The evolutionary approach replaces optimizing firms with satisficing firms, and thereby 
admits greater scope for a variety of consequences when the firm’s environment is modified.  
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very hard for such opportunities as long as things are going reasonably well.  An external shock 
such as a new environmental constraint can therefore constitute a stimulus to new search, 
possibly leading to discovery of previously undetected profit opportunities.  This observation 
forms the basis for the normative observation that environmental regulation may not be as costly 
as we expect, because the imposition of the new constraint may lead to the discovery of new 
ways of doing things.  In the limit, these new ways of doing things might actually be more 
profitable than the old ways, leading to an asserted “win-win” outcome.
39 
In general, advocates of the “win-win” view of the consequences of environmental 
regulation seem unaware of the connection between their argument and the evolutionary school 
of technological change.
40  But the ideas are similar: 
It is sometimes argued that companies must, by the very notion of profit seeking, be 
pursuing all profitable innovation…In this view, if complying with environmental 
regulation can be profitable, in the sense that a company can more than offset the cost of 
compliance, then why is such regulation necessary? 
The possibility that regulation might act as a spur to [profitable] innovation arises 
because the world does not fit the Panglossian belief that firms always make optimal 
choices…[T]he actual process of dynamic competition is characterized by changing 
technological opportunities coupled with highly incomplete information, organizational 
inertia and control problems reflecting the difficulty of aligning individual, group and 
corporate incentives. Companies have numerous avenues for technological improvement, 
and limited attention. (Porter and van der Linde 1995, pp. 98-99) 
Porter and other “win-win” theorists argued that in this non-optimizing world, regulation 
may lead to “innovation offsets” that “can not only lower the net cost of meeting environmental 
                                                 
39 Another related idea is that of “X-inefficiency” (Leibenstein, 1966). 
40 Neither Simon (1947) nor Nelson and Winter (1982) appear in the references of Porter and van der Linde (1995).  
Interestingly, Nelson and Winter themselves anticipated the connection.  In their 1982 book, they say “In a regime 
in which technical advance is occurring and organizational structure is evolving in response to changing patterns 
of demand and supply, new nonmarket interactions that are not contained adequately by prevailing laws and 
policies are almost certain to appear, and old ones may disappear…The canonical ‘externality’ problem of 
evolutionary theory is the generation by new technologies of benefits and costs that old institutional structures 
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regulations, but can even lead to absolute advantages over firms in foreign countries not subject 
to similar regulations” (Porter and van der Linde 1995, p. 98).  Of course, the fact that firms 
engage in non-optimizing behavior creates a possibility for profit improvements, without 
suggesting that such improvements would be the norm, would be systematic, or even likely.  But 
win-win theorists propose several reasons why innovation offsets are likely to be common. 
First, they argue that regulation provides a signal to companies about likely resource 
inefficiencies and potential technological improvements; that pollution is, by its very nature, 
indicative of resources being wasted, or at least not fully utilized.  Regulation focuses attention 
on pollution, and such attention is likely to lead to the saving of resources, which will often 
lower costs.  Second, regulation provides or requires the generation of information; since 
information is a public good it may be underprovided without such incentives.  Third, regulation 
reduces uncertainty about the payoffs to investments in environmental innovation.  There may be 
potential investments that are believed to be profitable in an expected value sense, and also 
deliver environmental benefits, but which are highly risky in the absence of regulation that 
ensures that the environmental benefits are also privately valuable.  Regulation, in effect, 
provides “insurance” against the risk of investing in new technology, part of whose benefit 
cannot be internalized.  Fourth, new technology that is initially more costly may produce long-
run competitive advantage, because of learning-by-doing or other “first-mover” advantages, if 
other countries eventually impose similarly strict standards.  Finally, regulation simply creates 
pressure.  Such pressure plays an important role in the innovation process, “to overcome inertia, 
foster creative thinking and mitigate agency problems” (Porter and van der Linde 1995, p. 100). 
Porter and van der Linde (1995) provided numerous case studies of particular firms who 
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a result.  It should be emphasized, however, that win-win theorists do not claim that all 
environmental regulations generate significant innovation offsets.  Indeed, they emphasize that 
regulation must be properly designed in order to maximize the chances for encouraging 
innovation. Quantitative evidence is limited.  Boyd and McClelland (1999) and Boyd and Pang 
(2000) employ data envelopment analysis to evaluate the potential at paper and glass plants for 
“win-win” improvements that increase productivity and reduce energy use or pollution.  They 
find that the paper industry could reduce inputs and pollution by 2-8% without reducing 
productivity.     
Generally, economists have been skeptical of the win-win theory (Palmer et al. 1995; 
Oates et al. 1993).    From a theoretical perspective, it is possible to model apparently inefficient 
firm behavior as the (second-best) efficient outcome of imperfect information and divergent 
incentives among managers or between owners and managers in a principal/agent framework.
41  
From this perspective, the apparent inefficiency does not have normative implications.  Since 
firms are doing the best they can given their information environment, it is unlikely that the 
additional constraints represented by environmental policy interventions would be beneficial. 
On a more concrete level, it is not clear that pollution generally signals “waste”; most 
physical and biological processes have by-products of some sort, and whether the extent of such 
by-products is “wasteful” or not is inherently a question of prices and costs.  More generally, 
firms’ rationality is surely bounded, but that does not mean that unexploited profit opportunities 
are frequent.  Palmer et al. (1995) surveyed firms affected by regulation—including those cited 
by Porter and van der Linde as success stories — and found that most firms say that the net cost 
to them of regulation is, in fact, positive. 
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For regulation to have important informational effects, the government must have better 
information than firms have about the nature of environmental problems and their potential 
solutions.  This seems questionable.  Of course, the government may have better information 
about which environmental problems it considers most important, but it is not clear how 
conveying this type of information would produce win-win outcomes.  As to overcoming inertia, 
most firms in today’s world feel a lot of pressure, so it seems unlikely that the additional pressure 
of regulation is going to have beneficial stimulating effects on innovation.  Finally, while it 
seems likely that environmental regulation will stimulate the innovation and diffusion of 
technologies that facilitate compliance, creation and adoption of new technology will typically 
require real resources, and have significant opportunity costs.  The observation that the new 
technology is cost-saving on a forward-looking basis is not sufficient to conclude that the firm 
was made better off by being induced to develop and/or adopt the new technology. 
Overall, the evidence on induced innovation and the win-win hypothesis seems to be a 
case of a “partially full glass” that analysts see as mostly full or mostly empty, depending on 




Overview of Conclusions on Induced Innovation and the “Win-win” Hypothesis 
 
Areas of Agreement 
Historical evidence indicates that a significant but not predominant fraction of innovation in the energy and 
environment area is induced. 
Environmental regulation is likely to stimulate innovation and technology adoption that will facilitate environmental 
compliance. 
Much existing environmental regulation uses inflexible mechanisms likely to stifle innovation; “incentive-based” 
mechanisms are likely to be more conducive to innovation. 
Firms are boundedly rational so that external constraints can sometimes stimulate innovation that will leave the firm 
better off. 
First-mover advantages may result from domestic regulation that correctly anticipates world-wide trends. 
Areas of Disagreement 
Win-Win Theory  Neoclassical Economics 
Widespread case-study evidence indicates significant
“innovation offsets” are common. 
Case studies are highly selective.  Firms believe 
regulation is costly. 
Innovation in response to regulation is evidence of 
offsets that significantly reduce or eliminate the cost of 
regulation. 
When cost-reducing innovation occurs, the opportunity 
cost of R&D and management effort makes a true “win-
win” outcome unlikely. 
Pollution is evidence of waste, suggesting why cost-
reducing innovation in response to regulation might be 
the norm. 
Costs are costs; even if firms are not at the frontier, side-
effects of pollution reduction could just as easily be bad 
as good. 
Existing productivity or cost studies do not capture 
innovation offsets. 
Existing productivity and cost studies suggest that 
innovation offsets have been very small. 
There is much evidence of innovation offsets even 
though existing regulations are badly designed.  This 
suggests that offsets from good regulation would be 
large. 
Since there is agreement that bad regulations stifle 
innovation, the apparent beneficial effects of existing 
regulation only show that case studies can be very 
misleading. Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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4. Diffusion 
4.1. Microeconomics of Diffusion 
From the mechanical reaper of the nineteenth century (David 1966), through hybrid corn 
seed (Griliches 1957), steel furnaces (Oster 1982), optical scanners (Levin et al. 1987) and 
industrial robots (Mansfield 1989), research has consistently shown that the diffusion of new, 
economically superior technologies is a gradual process.
42  Typically, the fraction of potential 
users that has adopted a new technology follows a sigmoid or “S-shaped” path over time, rising 
only slowly at first, then entering a period of very rapid growth, followed by a slowdown in 
growth as the technology reaches maturity and most potential adopters have switched (Geroski 
2000). 
The explanation for the apparent slowness of the technology diffusion process has been a 
subject of research in a variety of disciplines.  Two main forces have been emphasized.  First, 
potential technology adopters are heterogeneous, so that a technology that is generally superior 
will not be equally superior for all potential users, and may remain inferior to existing 
technology for some users for an extended period of time after its introduction.  Second, 
adopting a new technology is a risky undertaking, requiring considerable information, both about 
the generic attributes of the new technology and about the details of its use in the particular 
application being considered.  It takes time for information to diffuse sufficiently, and the 
diffusion of the technology is limited by this process of diffusion of information. 
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The two main models of the diffusion process each emphasize one of these two aspects of 
the process.
43  The probit or rank model, first articulated in an unpublished paper by Paul David 
(1969), posits that potential adopters are characterized by a distribution of value or returns 
associated with the new technology.
44  Because adoption is costly, at any moment in time there is 
a threshold point on this distribution, such that potential users with values at or above this 
threshold will want to adopt, and users for whom the value of the new technology is below this 
threshold will not want to adopt.  Because the new technology will typically get cheaper and 
better as time passes after its initial introduction, this threshold will gradually move to the right, 
and eventually sweep out the entire distribution.  If the distribution of underlying values is 
normal (or another single-peaked distribution with similar shape), this gradual movement of the 
threshold across the distribution will produce the typical S-shaped diffusion curve. 
The other widely-used model is called the epidemic model (Griliches 1957; Stoneman 
1983).  The epidemic model presumes that the primary factor limiting diffusion is information, 
and that the most important source of information about a new technology is people or firms who 
have tried it.  Thus technology spreads like a disease, with the instigation of adoption being 
contact between the “infected” population (people who have already adopted) and the uninfected 
population.  Denoting the fraction of the potential using population that has adopted as f, this 




β = − .  Solution of this equation yields a logistic 
function, which has the characteristic S-shape.  The parameter β  captures the “contagiousness” 
                                                 
43 For empirical examples that integrate the two models, see Trajtenberg (1990) and Kerr and Newell (2000). 
44 This has sometimes been called the rank model since potential adopters can be ranked in terms of their potential 
benefits from adoption (Karshenas and Stoneman 1995).  Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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of the disease, presumably related to the cost of the new technology and the degree of its 
superiority over the technology it replaces (Griliches 1957).
45 
The probit model emphasizes adoption as the result of value-maximizing decisions by 
heterogeneous adopters.  As such, at least in its basic form, it does not suggest that the slow 
diffusion of new technology is anything but optimal.  In contrast, in the epidemic model each 
adopter generates a positive externality by transferring information to other potential adopters.  
This suggests that laissez-faire adoption rates may indeed be socially suboptimal.  We return to 
this issue in Sections 4.2.2 below. 
Finally, we note an important issue of feedback from the diffusion process to the earlier 
stages of invention and innovation.  The rate at which a technology diffuses determines in large 
part the rate at which its production volume grows.  And as stated earlier, market size tends to be 
an important determinant of R&D effort and innovative activity, so that growing use increases 
the incentive for R&D to improve the product. Furthermore, if the production process is 
characterized by learning by doing, then quality may rise and production costs fall as production 
experience is accumulated.  This possibility creates an additional source of positive externality 
associated with technology adoption, and may introduce dynamic increasing returns to scale for 
individual technologies.  This issue is also discussed below in Section 4.1.1. 
In the literature unrelated to environmental technology, both theory and empirical 
evidence are clear that technology diffusion rates depend on the strength of economic incentives 
for technology adoption.  Both of the models discussed above predict that the present value of 
                                                 
45 Both the probit and epidemic models typically  focus on the fraction of the population that had adopted at a point 
in time.  If one has individual-level data on adopters, one can take as the dependent variable the individual time 
until adoption.  This leads to a duration or hazard model (Karshenas and Stoneman 1995; Rose and Joskow 1990). 
Kerr and Newell (2000) employed a duration model to analyze technology adoption decisions by petroleum 
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benefits from adoption and the initial adoption cost enter into decisions affecting the diffusion 
rate.
46  In the probit model, this net present value comparison determines the location of the 
adoption threshold that determines what fraction of potential adopters will adopt at a moment in 
time.  In the epidemic model, this net present value comparison determines the magnitude of the 
“contagiousness” parameter, which in turn determines the speed at which the technology spreads 
from adopters to previous non-adopters. 
Empirical studies have addressed the influence on diffusion of factors such as firm size, 
R&D expenditure, market share, market structure, input prices, technology costs, firm 
ownership, and other institutional factors.  The classic empirical study is by Griliches (1957), 
who showed that the rate of adoption of hybrid corn seed in different regions depended on the 
economic superiority of the new seed in that region.  David (1966) showed that the first adopters 
of the mechanical reaper were larger farms, who benefited more from the decreased variable cost 
it permitted.  Mansfield (1968) also found the rate of diffusion to depend on firm size (as do 
most studies), as well as the riskiness of the new technology and the magnitude of the investment 
required for adoption.
 47  
4.1.1.  Increasing returns and technology lock-in 
Increasing returns to adoption — in the form of learning curves and positive adoption 
externalities — are a significant feature of market penetration processes for many technologies.  
Learning-by-doing describes how cumulative production experience with a product leads to 
                                                 
46 The fact that technology costs enter into the adoption decision demonstrates the close link between technology 
innovation and diffusion in both theory and reality. A key mechanism of diffusion is the gradual adoption of a new 
technology as its cost falls (and/or quality improves). Such cost and quality improvements represent innovation.  
Likewise, incentives for innovation will depend on the eventual demand for a new or improved product, that is, 
diffusion.  This linkage also points to the difficulty of empirically distinguishing between technology innovation 
and diffusion since they depend on one another and also both depend on similar external incentives such as 
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reduced production costs, while learning-by-using captures how the value of a good increases for 
consumers as they gain experience using it.  Positive adoption externalities arise when a non-
user’s probability of adoption is increased the greater the number of potential users who have 
already adopted (Berndt and Pindyck 2000).  This could occur because of fad or herding effects, 
or because of “network externalities.”  Network externalities exist if a product is technologically 
more valuable to an individual user as other users adopt a compatible product (for example, 
telephone and computer networks).  These phenomena can be critical to understanding the 
existing technological system, forecasting how that system might evolve, and predicting the 
potential effect of some policy or event. 
Furthermore, increasing returns to adopting a particular technology or system have been 
linked with so-called technology “lock-in,” in which a particular product, technical standard, 
production process, or service is produced by a market, and it is difficult to move to an 
alternative competing technology.  Lock-in implies that, once led down a particular technological 
path, the barriers to switching may be prohibitive.  This can be problematic if it would have been 
in the broader social interest to adopt a fundamentally different pattern of technological capacity.  
In turn, it raises the question of whether policy interventions — possibly involving central 
coordination and information assessment, direct technology subsidies, or publicly funded 
research, development, demonstration, and procurement programs — might avoid undesirable 
cases of technology lock-in by guiding technological paths in directions superior to those that 
would be taken by the free market.   
A classic, although somewhat controversial, example given is the QWERTY keyboard 
layout (David 1985).  As the story goes, the so-called Dvorak keyboard system is ergonomically 
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more efficient than the standard layout.  In other words, we could all type faster and better if we 
learned the Dvorak system.  Unfortunately, the QWERTY system got there first, so to speak, and 
we may be stuck with it, due in part to network externalities and learning-by-doing.   
Increasing returns are necessary but not sufficient conditions for persistent and 
undesirable lock-in.  There must also be costs associated with maintaining parallel rival networks 
or “switching costs” associated with moving between systems (for example, cost of buying a 
new keyboard or learning to type on a new keyboard layout).  The presence of these factors, 
however, in theory has the potential to lead to a market equilibrium in which a socially 
suboptimal standard or technology is employed. Nonetheless, an inefficient outcome need not 
necessarily result, and if it does it may not be lasting.  Market forces will eventually tend to 
challenge the predominance of an inferior technology (see Ruttan 1997). 
A related characteristic of products or systems subject to increasing returns or “positive 
feedbacks” is that history can be critical. While other markets can often be explained by current 
demand and supply, markets subject to increasing returns may not be fully understandable 
without knowing the pattern of historical technology adoption.  Work by Arthur (1989, 1990, 
1994), David (1985, 1997) and others (Foray 1997) on the importance of such “path 
dependence” have focused on the lasting role that chance historical events can play in leading 
market outcomes down one rather than another possible path. It is important to note that 
increasing returns and technology lock-in do not necessarily imply market failure.  In cases 
where they may, the question becomes what policies, markets, or institutions, if any, can 
ameliorate undesirable technological paths or eventual lock-in. 
We are far from having a well-established theoretical or empirical basis for when 
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take.  (See Section 4.2.3 for applications to environmental and energy issues.)  David (1997, p 
36) suggested that perhaps the most productive question to ask is “how can we identify situations 
in which it is likely that at some future time individuals really would be better off had another 
equilibria been selected” from the beginning.  One thing that public policy can do, David 
suggested, is try to delay the market from irreversible commitments before enough information 
has been obtained about the likely implications of an early, precedent-setting decision.
48 One 
could construe current policy discussions surrounding certain biotechnology developments as 
potentially doing just that.   
Network Externalities.  Besen and Farrell (1994), Katz and Shapiro (1994), and 
Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) together provide an overview of issues surrounding network 
effects. Several properties of “network markets” distinguish them from other markets, influence 
the strategies firms pursue, and may lead to market inefficiencies including oligopoly or 
monopoly.  Network markets tend to tip; that is, the coexistence of incompatible products may 
be unstable, resulting in a single standard dominating the market. Two potential inefficiencies 
can also arise due to demand side coordination difficulties in the presence of network 
externalities: excess inertia (users wait too long to adopt a new technology) or excess momentum 
(users rush to an inferior technology to avoid being stranded) (see Farrell and Saloner 1985). The 
role of information is central; the possibility of locking into an inferior technology is greater 
when users have incomplete information, and it is expectations about the ultimate size of a 
network that is crucial to which technology dominates.  The root problem is the difficulty of 
collective coordination in a decentralized process (David 1997). 
                                                 
48 See Majd and Pindyck (1989) for an analysis that explicitly treats learning-by-doing as an irreversible investment 
decision. Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
  48
One way to address this coordination problem is through standards — that is, a particular 
technology chosen for universal adoption — which are often adopted by government or industry 
associations when network externalities are present (telephone signals, for example).
49 While 
standards may help avoid excess inertia and reduce users’ search and coordination costs, they 
can also reduce diversity and may be subject to the strategy of a dominant firm.  Katz and 
Shapiro (1994) point out that while network effects can lead to market inefficiencies, there are 
many possible market responses to these problems that do not necessarily involve government 
intervention.  Furthermore, there is a question about whether the government has the proper 
incentives and information to improve the situation.   
Learning-by-Doing and Learning-by-Using. In early production stages, the manufacture 
of technologically complex products is fraught with difficulties.  As a firm produces more and 
more of the product, however, it learns to produce it more efficiently and with higher levels of 
quality.  Production experience leads to the rationalization of processes, reduced waste, and 
greater labor force expertise.  When this is so, average production costs will tend to decrease 
over time and with increases in the firm's cumulative output, albeit at a decreasing rate.   
Alternative terms used to denote this characteristic learning pattern and related phenomena 
include “learning curve”, “experience curve”, “learning-by-doing”, and “progress function.”   
Learning-by-using, the demand-side counterpart of learning-by-doing, can complement and 
reinforce these learning effects as adoption increases with greater experience in use and 
increased productivity over time by the user (see Sunding and Zilberman 2000). 
A technology with an initial cost advantage can allow for pricing that increases market 
share.  In turn, increased market share can lead to even greater learning, cost reductions, and 
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competitive advantage — a virtuous circle for the firms producing the technology.   
Unfortunately, as with network effects, this persistent cost advantage can create a kind of entry 
barrier if knowledge spillovers are incomplete.  In the extreme, the cost advantage may 
completely deter or “lock out” the entry of new technologies or rival systems, at least for a time.  
Spence (1981) showed that the main factors affecting costs and competition in the presence of 
learning are the rate of learning, the extent of learning-induced cost decline relative to the 
market, the intertemporal pattern of demand (that is, demand elasticity and growth), and the 
degree of spillovers of learning to other firms.
50 
4.2. Diffusion of green technology 
While the induced innovation literature focuses on the potential for environmental policy 
to bring forth new technology through innovation, there is also a widely-held view that 
significant reductions in environmental impacts could be achieved through more widespread 
diffusion of existing economically-attractive technologies, particularly ones that increase energy 
efficiency and thereby reduce emissions associated with fossil fuel combustion. For example, the 
report of the Interlaboratory Working Group (1997) compiled a comprehensive analysis of 
existing technologies that reportedly could reduce energy use and hence CO2 emissions at low or 
even negative net cost to users.  The observation that energy-efficient technologies that are cost-
effective at current prices are diffusing only slowly dates back to the 1970s, having been 
identified as a “paradox” at least as far back as Shama (1983). 
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As discussed in Section 4.1, above, the observation of apparently slow diffusion of 
superior technology is not a surprise when viewed in historical context.  Nonetheless, the 
apparent potential for emissions reductions associated with faster diffusion of existing 
technology raises two important questions.  First, what is the theoretical and empirical potential 
for “induced diffusion” of lower-emissions technologies? Specifically, how do environmental 
policy instruments that implicitly or explicitly increase the economic incentive to reduce 
emissions affect the diffusion rate of these technologies?  
A second and related question is the degree to which historical diffusion rates have been 
limited by market failures in the energy and equipment markets themselves (Jaffe and Stavins 
1994).  To the extent that diffusion has been and is limited by market failures, it is less clear that 
policies that operate by increasing the economic incentive to adopt such technology will be 
effective.  On the other hand, if such market failures are important, then policies focused directly 
on correction of such market failures provide, at least in principle, opportunities for policy 
interventions that are social-welfare increasing, even without regard to any environmental 
benefit. Table 3 summarizes the potential influence on technology diffusion of many of the 
factors discussed in this section. 
Table 3: Factors Influencing Technology Diffusion 
 
Factor  Likely Direction of Effect 
on Technology Diffusion 
Potential Policy/ 
Institutional Instrument 
Increased relative price of resource 
conserved by the technology 
(+)  tax on the resource 
Decreased cost and/or increased quality 
of technology 
(+) technology  subsidy 
Inadequate information, uncertainty, 
and agency problems regarding benefits 
and costs of technology adoption 




(+) technology  demonstration  and 
deployment, tax/subsidy Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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Network externalities  (?)  standards, planning, 
coordination 
Characteristics of potential adopters varied  flexible  regulation 
 
4.2.1.  Effects of resource prices and technology costs 
Kerr and Newell (2000) used a duration model to analyze the influence of plant 
characteristics and the stringency and the form of regulation on technology adoption decisions by 
petroleum refineries during the leaded gasoline phasedown.  They found that increased 
stringency (which raised the effective price of lead) encouraged greater adoption of lead-
reducing technology. They also found that larger and more technically sophisticated refineries, 
which had lower costs of adoption, were more likely to adopt the new technology. 
Rose and Joskow (1990) found a positive effect of fuel price increases on the adoption of 
a new fuel-saving technology in the U.S. electricity-generation sector, with the statistical 
significance of the effect depending on the year of the fuel price.  In a tobit analysis of steel plant 
adoption of different furnace technologies, Boyd and Karlson (1993) found a significant positive 
effect of increases in a fuel’s price on the adoption of technology that saves that fuel, although 
the magnitude of the effect was modest. For a sample of industrial plants in four heavily 
polluting sectors (petroleum refining, plastics, pulp and paper, and steel), Pizer et al. (2001) 
found that both energy prices and financial health were positively related to the adoption of 
energy-saving technologies. 
Jaffe and Stavins (1995) carried out econometric analyses of the factors affecting the 
adoption of thermal insulation technologies in new residential construction in the United States 
between 1979 and 1988.  They examined the dynamic effects of energy prices and technology Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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adoption costs on average residential energy-efficiency technologies in new home construction.
51  
They found that the response of mean energy efficiency to energy price changes was positive and 
significant, both statistically and economically.  Interestingly, they also found that equivalent 
percentage adoption cost changes were about three times as effective as energy price changes in 
encouraging adoption, although standard financial analysis would suggest they ought to be about 
equal in percentage terms.  This finding offers confirmation for the conventional wisdom that 
technology adoption decisions are more sensitive to up-front cost considerations than to longer-
term operating expenses. 
Hassett and Metcalf (1995) found an even larger discrepancy between the effect of 
changes in installation cost (here coming through tax credits) and changes in energy prices.  
There are three interrelated possible explanations for this.  One possibility is a behavioral bias 
that causes purchasers to focus more on up-front cost than they do on the lifetime operating costs 
of an investment.  An alternative (but probably indistinguishable) view is that purchasers focus 
equally on both, but uncertainty about future energy prices makes them give less weight to the 
current energy price (which is only an indicator of future prices) than they do to the capital cost, 
which is known.  A final interpretation might be that consumers actually have reasonably 
accurate expectations about future energy prices, and their decisions reflect those expectations, 
but our empirical proxies for their expectations are not correct. 
For households and small firms, adoption of new technologies with significant capital 
costs may be constrained by inadequate access to financing. And in some countries, import 
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barriers may inhibit the adoption of technology embodied in foreign-produced goods (Reppelin-
Hill 1999). 
On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that it is impossible to generalize, 
particularly across countries.  Nijkamp et al. (2001) presented the qualitative results of a survey 
of Dutch firms regarding their decisions on how much to invest in energy-efficient technologies.  
They found that general “barriers” to energy-efficient technology adoption – including the 
existence of alternative investments, low energy costs, and a desire to replace capital only when 
is fully depreciated – are more important than financial barriers and uncertainty about future 
technologies and prices. 
4.2.2.  Effects of inadequate information, agency problems, and uncertainty 
As discussed in Section 4.1, above, information plays an important role in the technology 
diffusion process.  There are two reasons why the importance of information may result in 
market failure.  First, information is a public good that may be expected in general to be 
underprovided by markets.  Second, to the extent that the adoption of the technology by some 
users is itself an important mode of information transfer to other parties, adoption creates a 
positive externality and is therefore likely to proceed at a socially suboptimal rate.
52  Howarth et 
al. (2000) explored the significance of inadequate information in inhibiting the diffusion of more 
efficient lighting equipment.  Metcalf and Hassett (1999) compared available estimates of energy 
savings from new equipment to actual savings realized by users who have installed the 
equipment.  They found that actual savings, while significant, were less than those promised by 
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engineers and product manufacturers.  Their estimate of the median realized rate of return is 
about 12%, which they found to be close to a discount rate for this investment implied by a                         
CAPM analysis. 
Also related to imperfect information are a variety of agency problems that can inhibit the 
adoption of superior technology.  The agency problem can be either external or internal to 
organizations.  An example of an external agency problem would be a landlord/tenant 
relationship, in which a tenant pays for utilities but the landlord makes decisions regarding which 
appliances to purchase, or vice versa.  Internal agency problems can arise in organizations where 
the individual or department responsible for equipment purchase or maintenance differs from the 
individual or department whose budget covers utility costs.
53  DeCanio (1998) explored the 
significance of organizational factors in explaining firms’ perceived returns to installation of 
energy-efficient lighting.
54 
Uncertainty is another factor that may limit the adoption of new technology (Geroski 
2000).  Such uncertainty is not a market failure, merely a fact of economic life.  Uncertainty can 
be inherent in the technology itself, in the sense that its newness means that users are not sure 
how it will be perform (Mansfield 1968).  For resource-saving technology, there is the additional 
uncertainty that the economic value of such savings depends on future resource prices, which are 
themselves uncertain.  This uncertainty about future returns means that there is an “option value” 
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54 Agency problems are probably part of the basis for the hypothesis that energy-saving investments are ignored 
simply because energy is too small a fraction of overall costs to justify management attention and decisionmaking.  
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associated with postponing the adoption of new technology (Pindyck 1991; Hassett and Metcalf 
1995, 1996). 
Closely related to the issue of uncertainty is the issue of the discount rate or investment 
hurdle rate used by purchasers in evaluating the desirability of new technology, particularly 
resource-conserving technology.  A large body of research demonstrates that purchasers appear 
to use relatively high discount rates in evaluating energy-efficiency investments (Hausman 1979; 
Ruderman et al. 1987; Ross 1990).  The implicit or explicit use of relatively high discount rates 
for energy savings does not represent a market failure in itself; it is rather the manifestation of 
underlying aspects of the decision process including those just discussed.  At least some portion 
of the discount rate premium is likely to be related to uncertainty, although the extent to which 
the premium can be explained by uncertainty and option value is subject to debate (Hassett and 
Metcalf 1995, 1996; Sanstad et al. 1995).
55  Capital market failures that make it difficult to 
secure external financing for these investments may also play a role.
56 
4.2.3.  Effects of Increasing Returns 
As described in Section 4.1, above, the presence of increasing returns in the form of 
learning effects, network externalities, or other positive adoption externalities presents the 
possibility that market outcomes for technologies exhibiting these features, including those with 
environmental consequences, may be inefficient.  For example, the idea that we are “locked into” 
a fossil-fuel-based energy system is a recurring theme in policy discussions regarding climate 
change and other energy-related environmental problems.  At a more aggregate level, there has 
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been much discussion of the question of whether it is possible for developing countries to take 
less environmentally-damaging paths of development than have currently industrialized 
countries, for example by relying less on fossil fuels.
57  
While the empirical literature is quite thin, some studies have explored the issue of 
increasing returns and technology lock-in for competing technologies within the energy and 
environment arenas, including analysis of renewable energy and fossil fuels (Cowan and Kline 
1996), the internal combustion engine and alternatively-fueled vehicles (Cowan and Hulten 
1996), pesticides and integrated pest management (Cowan and Gunby 1996), technologies for 
electricity generation (Islas 1997), nuclear power reactor designs (Cowan 1990), and the 
transition from hydrocarbon-based fuels (Kemp 1997). 
Energy and environment-related examples of empirical estimation of learning curves 
include work related to renewable energy and climate modeling (Nakicenovic 1996; Neij 1997; 
Grübler and Messner 1999; Grübler et al. 1999), nuclear reactors (Joskow and Rozanski 1979; 
Zimmerman 1982; Lester and McCabe 1993), and electricity supply (Sharp and Price 1990).  
Although network externalities can be an important element of increasing returns, especially for 
information and communication technologies, their role in environmental technologies is less 
evident. 
4.3.  Effects of instrument choice on diffusion 
4.3.1.  Theoretical Analyses  
The predominant theoretical framework for analyses of diffusion effects has been what 
could be called the “discrete technology choice” model:  firms contemplate the use of a certain 
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technology which reduces marginal costs of pollution abatement and which has a known fixed 
cost associated with it.  While some authors have presented this approach as a model of 
“innovation,”
58 it is more appropriately viewed as a model of adoption. 
With such models, several theoretical studies have found that the incentive for the 
adoption of new technologies is greater under market-based instruments than under direct 
regulation (Zerbe 1970;
59 Downing and White 1986; Milliman and Prince 1989; Jung et al. 
1996).  With the exception of Downing and White (1986), all of these studies examined the gross 
impacts of alternative policy instruments on the quantity of technology adoption.
60 
Theoretical comparisons among market-based instruments have produced only limited 
agreement. In a frequently-cited article, Milliman and Prince (1989) examined firm-level 
incentives for technology diffusion provided by five instruments:  command-and-control; 
emission taxes; abatement subsidies; freely-allocated emission permits, and auctioned emission 
permits.  Firm-level incentives for adoption in this representative-firm model were pictured as 
the consequent change in producer surplus.  They found that auctioned permits would provide 
the largest adoption incentive of any instrument, with emissions taxes and subsidies second, and 
freely allocated permits and direct controls last. The Milliman and Prince (1989) study was 
criticized by Marin (1991) because of its assumption of identical firms, but it was subsequently 
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for the case of small changes in emissions (so that the optimal pollution tax or permit quantity is unchanged) that 
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shown that the results remain largely unchanged with heterogeneous abatement costs  (Milliman 
and Prince 1992). 
In 1996, Jung et al. built on Milliman and Prince's basic framework for comparing the 
effects of alternative policy instruments, but rather than focusing on firm-level changes in 
producer surplus, they considered heterogeneous firms, and modeled the “market-level 
incentive” created by various instruments.
61  Their rankings echoed those of Milliman and Prince 
(1989):  auctioned permits provided the greatest incentive, followed by taxes and subsidies, free 
permits, and performance standards. 
Subsequent theoretical analyses (Parry 1998; Denicolò 1999; Keohane 1999) clarified 
several aspects of these rankings.  First,  there is the question of relative firm-level incentives to 
adopt a new, cost-saving technology when the price of pollution (permit price or tax level) is 
endogenous.  Milliman and Prince (1989), as well as Jung et al. (1996), argued that auctioned 
permits would provide greater incentives for diffusion than freely-allocated permits, because 
technology diffusion lowers the equilibrium permit price, bringing greater aggregate benefits of 
adoption in a regime where all sources are permit buyers (that is, auctions).  But when 
technology diffusion lowers the market price for tradeable permits, all firms benefit from this 
lower price regardless of whether or not they adopt the given technology (Keohane 1999).  Thus, 
if firms are price takers in the permit market, auctioned permits provide no more adoption 
incentive than freely-allocated permits. 
The overall result is that both auctioned and freely-allocated permits are inferior in their 
diffusion incentives to emission tax systems (but superior to command-and-control instruments).  
Under tradeable permits, technology diffusion lowers the equilibrium permit price, thereby 
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reducing the incentive for participating firms to adopt.  Thus, a permit system provides a lower 
adoption incentive than a tax, assuming the two instruments are equivalent before diffusion 
occurs (Denicolò 1999; Keohane 1999).
62 
More broadly, it appears that an unambiguous exhaustive ranking of instruments is not 
possible on the basis of theory alone.  Parry (1998) found that the welfare gain induced by an 
emissions tax is significantly greater than that induced by tradable permits only in the case of 
very major innovations.  Similarly, Requate (1998) included an explicit model of the final output 
market, and finds that whether (auctioned) permits or taxes provide stronger incentives to adopt 
an improved technology depends upon empirical values of relevant parameters.
63 
Furthermore, complete theoretical analysis of the effects of alternative policy instruments 
on the rate of technological change must include modeling of the government’s response to 
technological change, because the degree to which regulators respond to technologically-induced 
changes in abatement costs affects the magnitude of the adoption incentive associated with 
alternative policy instruments.
64  Because technology diffusion presumably lowers the aggregate 
marginal abatement cost function, it results in a change in the efficient level of control.  Hence, 
following diffusion, the optimal agency response is to set a more ambitious target.  Milliman and 
Prince (1989) examined the incentives facing private industry, under alternative policy 
instruments, to oppose such policy changes.  Their conclusion was that firms would oppose 
optimal agency adjustment of the policy under all instruments except taxes.  Under an emissions 
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tax, the optimal agency response to cost-reducing technological change is to lower the tax rate 
(assuming convex damages); under a subsidy, the optimal response is to lower the subsidy; under 
tradeable permit systems, the optimal response is to decrease the number of available permits, 
and thereby drive up the permit price.  Thus, firms have clear incentives to support the optimal 
agency response only under an emissions tax regime. 
In a comparison of tradeable permits and pollution taxes, Biglaiser et al. (1995) examined 
these instruments’ ability to achieve the first-best outcome in a dynamic setting.
65  They found 
that effluent taxes can do so, but permits cannot.  With an effluent tax, the optimal tax is 
presumably determined by marginal damages (which the authors assume to be constant), 
yielding a policy which is time consistent.  Whether or not firms adopt a cost-saving technology, 
the government has no incentive to change the tax rate.  From this perspective, however, 
tradeable permits are not time consistent, because the optimal number of permits in each period 
depends on both firms’ costs, which are determined by all previous investments, and marginal 
damages.  With constant marginal damages, and marginal abatement costs decreasing over time, 
the optimal number of permits should also be decreasing over time.  Firms may internalize this, 
and thereby invest less than optimally in pollution control technology. 
The result of Biglaiser et al. (1995) depends, however, on the assumption of constant 
marginal damages.  If marginal damages are not constant, then the optimal policy is determined 
by the interaction of marginal damages and marginal abatement costs for both taxes and permits.  
The result appears to be analogous to Weitzman's (1974) rule:  if the marginal damage curve is 
relatively flat and there is uncertainty in marginal costs (from the regulator's perspective) due to 
potential innovation at the firm level, then a price instrument is more efficient. 
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4.3.2. Empirical  Analyses   
Unlike the case of empirical analysis of the effects of alternative policy instruments on 
technology innovation (Section 3.2.3, above), where nearly all of the analysis focuses on energy-
efficiency technologies, in the case of technology diffusion, there is a small, but significant 
literature of empirical analyses focused on pollution-abatement technologies per se. 
One of the great successes during the modern era of environmental policy was the 
phasedown of lead in gasoline, which took place in the United States principally during the 
decade of the 1980's.  The phasedown was accomplished through a tradeable permit system 
among refineries, whereby lead rights could be exchanged and/or banked for later use.
66  As 
noted in Section 4.2.1, Kerr and Newell (2000) used a duration model to assess the effects of the 
phasedown program on technology diffusion.  As theory suggests (Malueg 1989), they found 
that the tradeable permit system provided incentives for more efficient technology adoption 
decisions, as evidenced by a significant divergence in the adoption behavior of refineries with 
low versus high compliance costs. Namely, the positive differential in the adoption propensity of 
expected permit sellers (i.e., low-cost refineries) relative to expected permit buyers (i.e., high-
cost refineries) was significantly greater under market-based lead regulation compared to under 
individually binding performance standards. 
Another prominent application of tradeable permit systems which has provided an 
opportunity for empirical analysis of the effects of policy instruments on technology diffusion is 
the sulfur dioxide allowance trading program, initiated under the U.S. Clean Air Act 
amendments of 1990.  In an econometric analysis, Keohane (2001) found evidence of the way in 
which the increased flexibility of a market-based instrument can provide greater incentives for 
technology adoption.  In particular, he found that the choice of whether or not to adopt a 
“scrubber” to remove sulfur dioxide — rather than purchasing (more costly) low-sulfur coal — 
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was more sensitive to cost differences (between scrubbing and fuel-switching) under the 
tradeable permit system than under the earlier emissions rate standard.
67   
In an examination of the effects of alternative policy instruments for reducing oxygen-
demanding water pollutants, Kemp (1998) found that effluent charges were a significant 
predictor of adoption of biological treatment by facilities.  In earlier work, Purvis and Outlaw 
(1995) carried out a case study of EPA’s permitting process for acceptable water-pollution 
control technologies in the U.S. livestock  production sector.  Those authors concluded that the 
relevant regulations encouraged the use of “time-tested” technologies that provided lower levels 
of environmental protection than other more innovative ones, simply because producers knew 
that EPA was more likely to approve a permit that employed the established approach. 
Another body of research has examined the effects on technology diffusion of command-
and-control environmental standards when they are combined with “differential environmental 
regulations.”  In many situations where command-and-control standards have been used, the 
required level of pollution abatement has been set at a far more stringent level for new sources 
than for existing ones.
68  There is empirical evidence that such differential environmental 
regulations have lengthened the time before plants were retired (Maloney and Brady 1988; 
Nelson et al. 1993).  Further, this dual system can actually worsen pollution by encouraging 
firms to keep older, dirtier plants in operation (Stewart 1981; Gollop and Roberts 1983; 
McCubbins et al. 1989). 
In addition to economic incentives, direct regulation, and information provision, some 
research has emphasized the role that “informal regulation” or community pressure can play in 
encouraging the adoption of environmentally clean technologies.  For example, in an analysis of 
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fuel adoption decisions for traditional brick kilns in Mexico, Blackman and Bannister (1998) 
suggested that community pressure applied by competing firms and local non-governmental 
organizations was associated with increased adoption of cleaner fuels, even when those fuels had 
relatively high variable costs. 
Turning from pollution abatement to energy efficiency, the analysis by Jaffe and Stavins 
(1995), described above in Section 4.2.1, provided evidence of the likely effects of energy taxes 
and technology adoption subsidies on the adoption of thermal insulation technologies in new 
residential construction in the United States.  Their findings suggest the response to energy taxes 
would be positive and significant, and that equivalent percentage technology cost subsidies 
would be about three times as effective as taxes in encouraging adoption, although standard 
financial analysis would suggest they ought to be about equal in percentage terms. These results 
were corroborated by the study of residential energy conservation investments by Hassett and 
Metcalf (1995), also described in Section 4.2.1, which suggested that tax credits for adoption 
would be up to eight times more effective than “equivalent” energy taxes. 
Although empirical evidence from these two studies indicate that subsidies may be more 
effective than “equivalent” taxes in encouraging technology diffusion, it is important to 
recognize some disadvantages of such subsidy approaches.  First, unlike energy prices, (energy-
efficiency) adoption subsidies do not provide incentives to reduce utilization.  Second, 
technology subsidies and tax credits can require large public expenditures per unit of effect, 
since consumers who would have purchased the product even in the absence of the subsidy still 
receive it.   In the presence of fiscal constraints on public spending, this raises questions about 
the feasibility of subsidies that would be sizable enough to have desired effects.
69 
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What about conventional command-and-control approaches?  Jaffe and Stavins (1995) 
also examined the effects of more conventional regulations on technology diffusion, in the form 
of state building codes.  They found no discernable effects.  It is unclear to what extent this is 
due to inability to measure the true variation across states in the effectiveness of codes, or to 
codes that were in many cases not binding relative to typical practice. This is a reminder, 
however, that although price-based policies will always have some effect, typical command-and-
control may have little effect if they are set below existing standards of practice. 
In a separate analysis of thermal home insulation, this one in the Netherlands, Kemp 
(1997) found that a threshold model of diffusion (based on a rational choice approach) could not 
explain observed diffusion patterns.  Instead, epidemic models provided a better fit to the data.  
Kemp also found that there was no significant effect of government subsidies on the adoption of 
thermal insulation by households. 
Attention has also been given to the effects on energy-efficiency technology diffusion of 
voluntary environmental programs.  Howarth et al. (2000) examined two voluntary programs of 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Green Lights and Energy Star programs, both of 
which are intended to encourage greater private industry use of energy-saving technologies.  A 
natural question from economics is why would firms carry out additional technology 
investments as part of a voluntary agreement?  The authors respond that there are a set of agency 
problems that inhibit economically wise adoption of some technologies (see discussion of these 
issues in Section 4.2.2). For example, most energy-saving investments are small, and senior staff 
may rationally choose to restrict funds for small projects that cannot be perfectly monitored.  The 
Green Lights program may be said to attempt to address this type of agency problem by 
providing information on savings opportunities at the level of the firm where decisions are 
made.
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Although the empirical literature on the effects of policy instruments on technology 
diffusion by no means settles all of the issues that emerge from the related theoretical studies, a 
consistent theme that runs through both the pollution-abatement and energy-efficiency empirical 
analyses is that market-based instruments are decidedly more effective than command-and-




In opening this chapter, we suggested that an understanding of the process of 
technological change is important for economic analysis of environmental issues for two broad 
reasons.  First, the environmental impact of social and economic activity is greatly affected by 
the rate and direction of technological change.  This linkage occurs because new technologies 
may either create or mitigate pollution, and because many environmental problems and policy 
responses are evaluated over timeframes in which the cumulative impact of technological 
changes is likely to be large.   
The importance of the first link is manifest in determining the economic and 
environmental “baseline” against which to measure the impacts of proposed policies.  That is, 
before we can discuss what we should or should not do about some environmental problem, we 
need to forecast how severe the problem will be in the absence of any action.  Such forecasts are 
always based, in some way, on extrapolation of historical experience.  Within that historical 
experience, the processes of technological change have been operating, often with significant 
consequences for the severity of environmental impacts.  Forecasts for the future based on this 
historical experience depend profoundly on the relative magnitude of the effects of price-induced 
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exogenous technical progress.  Sorting out these influences with respect to environmentally 
relevant technologies and sectors poses a major modeling and empirical challenge.  
A particularly important aspect of this set of issues is the historical significance of “lock-
in” phenomena for environmentally significant technologies.  We understand the theory of 
increasing returns and other sources of path dependence, but we have little evidence regarding 
their quantitative importance.  We know that it is theoretically possible, for example, that the 
dominant place of the internal combustion engine in our economy results from a combination of 
historical accidents and path dependence.  But the actual magnitude of such effects, relative to 
the role played by the superior attractiveness of the technology to individual users, has enormous 
consequences for the question of whether developing nations will be able or likely to find a 
different path. 
Another important area is in the conceptual and empirical modeling of how the various 
stages of technological change are interrelated, how they unfold over time, and the differential 
impact that various policies (for example, public-sector R&D, R&D subsidies to the private 
sector, environmental taxes, information programs) may have on each phase of technological 
change.  We have reviewed the existing literature on various aspects of technology policy, but 
there has been relatively little empirical analysis of these policy options directed specifically at 
the development of environmentally beneficial technology. 
There has been much debate surrounding the “win-win” hypothesis.  Much of this debate 
has been explicitly or implicitly ideological or political.  More useful would be detailed 
examinations regarding the kinds of policies and the kinds of private-sector institutions that are 
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  67
This observation is a natural bridge to the second broad linkage between technology and 
environment, the effect of environmental policy interventions on the process of technological 
change.  The empirical evidence to date is generally consistent with theoretical findings that 
market-based instruments for environmental protection are likely to have significantly greater, 
positive impacts over time than command-and-control approaches on the invention, innovation, 
and diffusion of desirable, environmentally-friendly technologies.  Further, empirical studies 
suggest that the response of technological change to relevant price changes can be surprisingly 
swift in terms of patenting activity and introduction of new model offerings—on the order of five 
years or less.  Substantial diffusion can sometimes take considerably longer, depending on the 
rate of retirement of previously installed equipment.  The longevity of much equipment 
reinforces the importance of taking a longer-term view toward improvements — on the order of 
decades.  Existing empirical studies have also produced some results that may not be consistent 
with theoretical expectations, such as the finding from two independent analyses that the 
diffusion of energy-efficiency technologies is more sensitive to variation in adoption-cost than to 
commensurate energy price changes.  Further theoretical and/or empirical work may resolve this 
apparent anomaly. 
A variety of refutable hypotheses that emerge from theoretical models of alternative 
instruments have not been tested rigorously with empirical data.  For example, the predictions 
from theory regarding the ranking of alternative environmental policy instruments is quite clear, 
but much of the empirical analysis has focused on energy-efficient technologies, rather than 
pollution abatement technologies per se.  The increased use of market-based instruments and 
performance-based standards has brought with it considerably more data with which hypotheses 
regarding the effects of policy instruments on technology innovation and diffusion can be tested. Resources for the Future    Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
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The potential long-run consequences of today’s policy choices create a high priority for 
broadening and deepening our understanding of the effects of environmental policy on 
innovation and diffusion of new technology.  Unfortunately, these issues cannot be resolved at a 
purely theoretical level, or on the basis of aggregate empirical analyses.  For both benefit-cost 
and cost-effectiveness analysis, we need to know the magnitudes of these effects, and these 
magnitudes are likely to differ across markets, technologies, and institutional settings.  Thus, 
taking seriously the notion of induced technological change and its consequences for 
environmental policy requires going beyond demonstration studies that test whether or not such 
effects exist, to carry out detailed analyses in a variety of sectors in order to understand the 
circumstances under which they are large or small.  This will require significant research 
attention from multiple methodological viewpoints over an extended period of time.  But the 
alternative is continuing to formulate public policies with significant economic and 
environmental consequences without being able to take into account what is going on “inside the 
black box” of technological change. 
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